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I. INTRODUCTION
This year's survey of cases includes a number of important decisions af-
fecting business owners' interests in personal and real property. For exam-
ple, in Olmstead v. Federal Trade Commission,1 the Supreme Court of Flori-
da held, but not without a strong dissenting opinion-and not without creat-
ing uncertainty as to the right of a creditor to reach the membership interest
of a member of a multi-member limited liability company (LLC)2 -that a
judgment creditor may reach the entire membership interest of the owner of a
single-member of a Florida LLC.3 A Florida district court of appeal decided
in Robertson v. Deeb4 that an individual retirement account (IRA) benefi-
ciary's interest in an "inherited IRA" is subject to garnishment by creditors.5
And in State v. Hanson,6 another Florida district court of appeal held that
enforcement of a foreign income tax judgment in Florida was not against
Florida's public policy.7 On the takings front, in M & H Profit, Inc. v. City
of Panama City,8 yet another Florida district court of appeal held that the
Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act (Bert Harris Act)
did not apply where the property owner had not formally filed its develop-
ment application at the time the city enacted a height and set-back ordin-
ance,9 but dissent was voiced here as well.10
This year's survey addresses, with only limited exceptions, cases of first
impression, cases certifying or identifying conflicts between the Florida Dis-
trict Courts of Appeal, and questions certified to the Supreme Court of Flori-
da by the Florida District Courts of Appeal or the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
1. 44 So. 3d 76 (Fla. 2010); see infra note 63 and accompanying text.
2. See Olmstead, 44 So. 3d at 86 (Lewis, J., dissenting, in whose opinion Polston, J.,
concurred).
3. Id. at 83 (majority opinion).
4. 16 So. 3d 936 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see infra note 521 and accompanying
text.
5. Robertson, 16 So. 3d at 939-40.
6. 36 So. 3d 879 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam).
7. Id. at 880.
8. 28 So. 3d 71 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
9. Id. at 73, 76.
10. Id. at 78 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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II. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In a contract dispute, the parties agreed to the abatement of litigation
and the submission of the case to arbitration." After the arbitrator rendered
his decision in favor of Commercial Interiors Corp. of Boca Raton (Com-
mercial), Pinkerton & Laws, Inc. (Pinkerton) successfully moved the trial
court to set aside the order of the arbitrator. 12 Pinkerton's argument was that
the contracts were illegal under section 489.128 of the Florida Statutes be-
cause Commercial did not have a contractor's license. 13 The trial court con-
cluded that the arbitration provision in both contracts and the contracts them-
selves-which were on forms that Pinkerton drafted-were unenforceable,
finding that "the arbitrator had misapplied section 489.128."' 4 Commercial
appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed.' 5 In Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,16 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that under the Federal Arbitration Act, also applicable to cases brought
in state court, "the issue of [a] contract's validity is [decided] by the arbitra-
tor in the first instance" and not by the court.' 7 This rule has also been ap-
plied to decisions under the Florida Statutes.'8 Here, the arbitrator had in the
first instance decided that the contracts were valid.' 9 Next, the appellate
court listed the five grounds under section 682.13 of the Florida Statutes for
asking the court to set aside the arbitrator's decision:
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue
means; (b) there was evident partiality by the arbitrator appointed,
corruption in any of the arbitrators or umpire, or misconduct pre-
11. Commercial Interiors Corp. of Boca Raton v. Pinkerton & Laws, Inc., 19 So. 3d
1062, 1063 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
12. Id.
13. Id. Section 489.128 of the Florida Statutes provided that "[a]s a matter of public
policy," contracts made by unlicensed contractors are unenforceable by the contractor. FLA.
STAT. § 489.128 (2002) (amended 2003).
14. Commercial Interiors Corp. of Boca Raton, 19 So. 3d at 1063.
15. Id. at 1063, 1065.
16. 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
17. Id. at 446; Commercial Interiors Corp. of Boca Raton, 19 So. 3d at 1063; accord
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778-79 (2010).
18. See Commercial Interiors Corp. of Boca Raton, 19 So. 3d at 1064. The Fifth District
Court of Appeal did not rule as to whether this case was governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA), but that on the issue of who decides the contract's validity, the law is effectively
the same, and on the other issue-the grounds to set aside an arbitration award-it did not
matter whether the Florida statute or the FAA applied, since "the grounds for relief are essen-
tially the same." Id. at 1063-64, 1064 n.2.
19. Id. at 1063.
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judicing the rights of any party; (c) the arbitrators or the umpire in
the course of exercising jurisdiction exceeded their powers; (d) the
arbitrators or the umpire in the course of her or his jurisdiction re-
fused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown
or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or other-
wise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of sec-
tion 682.06, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; (e)
there was no agreement or- provision for arbitration subject to this
law .... 20
It appeared to the Fifth District Court of Appeal that the trial judge
"simply disagreed with the arbitrator's application of the law to the facts. 21
That was not enough to set aside the arbitrator's ruling.22 In conclusion, the
district court noted that under Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega,23 the
arbitrator's error of law was insufficient to set aside an arbitration award. 24
In another arbitration case, a provision in an arbitration agreement al-
lowed the contesting parties to each choose an arbitrator, and the two arbitra-
tors so chosen would then pick a "neutral arbitrator.' 25 Another provision
directed that claims under the agreement be decided by a "'neutral panel of
arbitrators. 26 One party objected to the other's choice of an arbitrator as
being biased.27 The other party argued that the arbitrator selected by a party
did not have to be neutral.28 The trial court agreed with the objecting party
and ordered that another arbitrator be chosen.29 The Second District Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court per curiam.3° Judge LaRose, in a specially
concurring opinion written in support of the per curiam decision, noted that
the American Arbitration Association allows for the parties to select non-
neutral arbitrators if the parties so agree, but there was no agreement to that
effect here.3 '
20. Id. at 1064.
21. Id.
22. Commercial Interiors Corp. of Boca Raton, 19 So. 3d at 1064.
23. 542 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1989).
24. Commercial Interiors Corp. of Boca Raton, 19 So. 3d at 1064 (citing Schnurmacher
Holding, Inc., 542 So. 2d at 1329).
25. Whitehead v. Smith, 23 So. 3d 1281, 1281 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam)
(LaRose, J., specially concurring) (quoting the parties' arbitration agreement).
26. Id. (quoting the parties' arbitration agreement).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Whitehead, 23 So. 3d at 1281 (per curiam) (denying the petitioners' writ of certiora-
ri).
31. Id. at 1281-82 (LaRose, J., specially concurring).
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HI. ATrORNEYS' FEES
In BDO Seidman, LLP v. Bee,32 Mr. Bee (Partner) had been a Florida
partner in BDO Seidman, LLP (Partnership), and Partner and Partnership had
executed a three-page agreement titled "Understanding Regarding Continued
Employment" (the Understanding). 33 The Understanding provided compen-
sation to Partner that included a guaranteed payment for the following four
years and a bonus for the fiscal year in which the agreement was signed.34
Partnership sought to rescind the Understanding and to "terminat[e] [Part-
ner]'s partnership interest for cause., 35 After prevailing in arbitration, Part-
ner sued Partnership for attorney's fees under section 448.08 of the Florida
Statutes.36 Section 448.08 allows an award of costs and attorney's fees in a
suit seeking unpaid wages.37 Neither the Understanding nor the partnership
agreement contained a provision regarding an award of costs and attorney's
fees to the prevailing party should a dispute arise under the agreements.38
The trial court awarded Partner $286,655.50 as attorney's fees based on sec-
tion 448.08, and Partnership appealed. 39 The Third District Court of Appeal
stated the question before it as "whether an attorney's fee statute applicable
to an action for 'unpaid wages' . . . applies to a compensation dispute be-
tween a partner and an LLP."4 Partnership asserted that Partner was a co-
owner asking for partnership profits, not an employee claiming unpaid sala-
ry.4 1 Partner testified that he reported his income from Partnership based on
the information provided in the partnership Form Schedule K-1 provided to
him.4 2 Noting that this appeared to be a matter of first impression, the Third
District, based on the record presented, decided that section 448.08 did ap-
ply.4 3 The arbitrator had determined that the Understanding existed separate-
ly from the partnership agreement, and the trial court found that the Under-
standing could be characterized as an employment agreement.44 The arbitra-
tor's findings of fact or law, even if mistaken, were not within Florida's sta-
32. 24 So. 3d 1278 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
33. Id. at 1279.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1280.
36. Id. at 1281; FLA. STAT. § 448.08 (2008).
37. BDO Seidman, L.L.P., 24 So. 3d at 1279 n.1.
38. Id. at 1280.
39. Id. at 1281.
40. Id. at 1279 (citations omitted).
41. id. at 1281.
42. BDO Seidman, L.LP., 24 So. 3d at 1280.
43. Id. at 1279, 1281.
44. Id.
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tutory grounds for setting aside an arbitration award under section 682.13 of
the Florida Statutes.4' The Third District Court affirmed the fee award, add-
ing that if partnerships wish to avoid the effect of section 448.08, "it may be
advisable to put that intention in writing. ' 46
IV. BuSiNESS ENTITIES, ARRANGEMENTS, AND AGREEMENTS
A. Administratively Dissolved Foreign Corporation: Right to Maintain
Suit in Florida
Once a foreign corporate plaintiff has been administratively dissolved,
may it continue to pursue an action in court? Under the facts presented in
Selepro, Inc. v. Church,47 the Fourth District Court of Appeal answered yes.48
Selepro, Inc. (Corporation), a Delaware corporation, qualified in 2003 to do
business in Florida.49 In 2004, Corporation sued an officer/shareholder, a
former employee, and another corporation alleging breach of contract and
several torts, including conversion and misappropriation. ° Corporation filed
amended complaints, and in 2005, at the time of the filing of its Third
Amended Complaint, Corporation was a valid corporation in Delaware and
was still "authorized to do business in Florida., 51 However, in March 2006,
approximately five years after it had incorporated in Delaware, Corporation's
existence was terminated by the State of Delaware.52 About six months later,
in September 2006, Florida administratively revoked Corporation's authority
to do business in Florida.53 More than a year later, in December 2007, the
two non-corporate defendants successfully moved for summary judgment
relying on sections 607.1501 and 607.1502(1) of the Florida Statutes.54 The
45. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 682.13 (2010).
46. BDO Seidman, LL.P., 24 So. 3d at 1281.
47. 17 So. 3d 1267 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
48. Id. at 1268.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1268, 1268 n.l. The other claims were "diversion of corporate assets,
fraud .... defamation, and tortious interference with business opportunity." Id. at 1268.
51. Selepro, Inc., 17 So. 3d at 1268.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 1269. Section 607.1501 of the Florida Statutes provides that "[a] foreign
corporation may not transact business in [Florida] until it obtains a certificate of authority
from the Department of State." Id. at 1270 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 607.1501(1) (2010)). Under
section 607.1502(1) of the Florida Statutes, if a foreign corporation engages in business with-
out obtaining such certificate, "the corporation 'may not maintain a [court] proceeding"' until
a certificate has been obtained. Selepro, Inc., 17 So. 3d at 1270 (quoting FLA. STAT. §
607.1502(1)). However, section 607.1501(2)(a) says that "'[m]aintaining, defending, or set-
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Fourth District reversed. The district court cited Allied Roofing Industries,
Inc. v. Venegas56 for the proposition that under sections 607.1421(3) and
607.1405(1) of the Florida Statutes, winding up of a dissolved corporation's
business may include suing and defending claims connected to the winding
up of the corporation's business.57 The Fourth District said that "an admini-
stratively dissolved corporation has the capacity to sue... [if] necessary" in
winding up its business and liquidating. 58 Although the statutory provisions
relied on by the defendants require that a foreign corporation "transacting
business" in Florida keep its Florida authorization to do so, in effect, if it
desires to maintain actions in Florida courts, Corporation was not transacting
business. 59 Rather, it was winding up its business affairs, and as part of that
process was permitted by section 607.1421(3) of the Florida Statutes to
maintain a court action.60 The Fourth District Court said that "[i]n conclu-
sion, the plaintiff filed suit when it was in good standing" and "[w]hen the
defendants filed their motion for summary judgment," the plaintiff was no
longer transacting business.61 Accordingly, Corporation "should be permit-
ted to maintain the proceeding solely to wind up its affairs [under] section607.1421(3). "6
B. Execution on Member's Entire Interest in Single-Member LLC
"Whether Florida law permits a court to order a judgment debtor to sur-
render all right, title, and interest in the debtor's single-member limited lia-
bility company to satisfy an outstanding judgment" was the rephrased ques-
tion certified by United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to
the Supreme Court of Florida in Olmstead. The Supreme Court of Florida
tling any proceeding"' is not transacting business under Chapter 607. Id. at 1270 (quoting
FLA. STAT. § 607.1501(2)(a)).
55. Id. at 1270.
56. 862 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
57. Selepro, Inc., 17 So. 3d at 1269 (citing Allied Roofing Indus., Inc., 862 So. 2d at 8);
see also FLA. STAT. §§ 607.1405(1), .1421(3).
58. Selepro, Inc., 17 So. 3d at 1269. Did the Fourth District Court of Appeal intend to
limit its holding to situations where the plaintiff-corporation's suit had been filed prior to its
administrative dissolution?
59. Id. at 1270.
60. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 607.1421(3)). Section 607.1421(3) of the Florida Statutes
provides that a dissolved corporation may not engage in "business except [as] ... necessary to
wind up and liquidate." FLA. STAT. § 607.1421(3).
61. Selepro, Inc., 17 So. 3d at 1270.
62. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. 607.1421(3)).
63. Olmstead v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 44 So. 3d 76, 78 (Fla. 2010); see also supra note 1
and accompanying text.
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answered in the affirmative. 64 The court looked to section 56.061 of the
Florida Statutes, which noted that "real and personal property, including
'stock in corporations, shall be subject to levy [by a judgment creditor] and
sale under execution."'' 65 The court stated that "[an LLC is a type of corpo-
rate entity," and an LLC ownership interest constitutes personal property
"reasonably understood to fall within the scope of 'corporate stock.', 66 In
the Florida Revised Uniform Partnership Act and the Florida Revised Li-
mited Partnership Act, a charging order giving the judgment creditor access
only to the judgment debtor's rights to profits and distributions from the
partnership is made the exclusive remedy available to a judgment creditor
with respect to partnership and limited partnership interests.67  Section
608.433(4) of the Florida Statutes authorizes a charging order against an
LLC member's interest similar to that available to a judgment creditor
against partnership and limited partnership interests.68 However, unlike
partnership charging orders, LLC charging orders are not stated to be the
exclusive remedy available to judgment creditors with respect to LLC inter-
ests.69 Therefore, a judgment creditor may proceed under section 56.061
against the judgment debtor member's entire right title and interest in the
LLC.7° Justice Lewis, joined by Justice Polston, wrote a strong dissent.7'
The ramifications of this decision remain to be seen.72
C. Statutory Indemnification of Corporate Officer/Employee
The United States alleged that the vice president and general manager
(Officer/Employee) of Banco Industrial de Venezuela, C.A. (Bank) for its
Miami agency "facilitated the deposit" of drug money into accounts at
Bank.73 Officer/Employee was prosecuted by the United States for alleged
money laundering.74 The jury found her guilty on each of the ten counts, but
"the trial judge granted [her] motion for judgment of acquittal [on] all
64. Olmstead, 44 So. 3d at 78.
65. Id. at 80 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 56.061 (2008)).
66. Id.
67. See id. at 82 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 620.8504, .1703).
68. Id. at 81; FLA. STAT. § 608.433(4) (2010).
69. Olmstead, 44 So. 3d at 82.
70. See id.
71. See id at 83 (Lewis, J., dissenting, joined by Polston, J.).
72. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
73. Banco Indus. de Venez., C.A., v. de Saad, 21 So. 3d 46, 47 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2009), reh'g granted by 28 So. 3d 44 (Fla. 2010).
74. Id.
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counts."7 5 The United States appealed the trial court's judgment. 76 Offic-
er/Employee subsequently agreed with the government that she would plead
guilty to a single "count of money structuring," and the government would
withdraw its appeal. 77 Officer/Employee, being unsuccessful in her subse-
quent request that Bank indemnify her for her attorney's fees incurred in the
federal prosecution and pay her past wages under the employment contract,
brought an action against Bank.7  Her claim for indemnification was based
on section 607.0850 of the Florida Statutes.79 In summary, this section pro-
vides that if a person is brought into an action by a third party "'by reason of
the fact that he or she is or was a director, officer, employee, or agent of the
corporation,"' the person is entitled to corporate reimbursement of his or her
defense expenses "'[if] successful on the merits or otherwise"' in defending
against such claims.8 ° On motion for summary judgment, the trial court
awarded Officer/Employee almost $3 million as indemnification and more
than $1.6 million as indemnification to the assignee of Officer/Employee's
right to attorney's fees and costs.8' The Third District Court of Appeal af-
firmed, relying heavily on the Delaware case of Perconti v. Thornton Oil
Corp.,82 that the Third District said interpreted a Delaware statute quite simi-
lar to section 607.0850 under facts similar to the case before it.83 The appel-
late court determined that Officer/Employee had been "successful on the
merits or otherwise" in the federal proceeding and that she had been prose-
cuted by the government "by reason of the fact" that she was an officer of
Bank.84 The Third District quoted Perconti for the proposition that the sta-
tute "does not require a determination that the corporate officer was 'inno-
cent."'85 Officer/Employee's plea deal did not change the result.86 Thus, the
Third District followed the Delaware court's holding when the court con-
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 47-48.
78. Banco Indus. de Venez, C.A., 21 So. 3d at 48.
79. Id.
80. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 607.0850(1), (3) (1999)).
81. Id. The assignee-attorney--who had defended Officer/Employee in the criminal
action-intervened in Officer/Employee's action against Corporation. Id. at 48 n.2 (citing
Beeler v. Banco Indus. de Venez., 834 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003), reh'g granted
Banco Indus. de Venez., C.A., v. de Saad, 28 So. 3d 44 (Fla. 2010) (unpublished table deci-
sion).
82. No. Civ. A. 18630-NC, 2002 WL 982419 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2002).
83. Banco Indus. de Venez., C.A., 21 So. 3d at 48-49.
84. Id. at 49.
85. Id. (quoting Perconti, 2002 WL 982419, at *4).
86. See id.
[Vol. 35
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss1/2
2010] SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW AFFECTING BUSINESS OWNERS 11
cluded that for purposes of Florida Statutes section 607.0850, dismissal
equals "success on the merits" as does "any result other than conviction. 87
Another issue in the case was Officer/Employee's claim for breach of
her employment contract for which the lower court awarded her more than
$1 million.8 8 Apparently, Bank had only suspended Officer/Employee with-
out pay and had not actually fired her under the terms of her employment
contract.89 The breach of employment contract award was also affirmed.90
Judge Schwartz specially concurred, expressing considerable displeasure
over the result on the breach of contract claim.9' "Legal consequences are
'determined not by what [something] is called, but by what it does' and is." 92
D. Statute of Limitations: Florida Securities Law
Sellers sold several Millennium Tower Condominium Hotel units to
Purchasers in 2004. 93 In 2008, after reading an article in The Wall Street
Journal to the effect that "sale of the condominium could be considered the
sale of securities," Purchasers sued Sellers alleging that Purchasers had not
received the required securities registration documentation.94 Purchasers
relied on Chapter 517 of the Florida Statutes, the Florida Securities and In-
vestor Protection Act, which requires, among other things, that purchase
agreements be registered by securities sellers, and that purchasers be pro-
vided a prospectus.95 The suit was dismissed with prejudice as barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.96 Purchasers appealed, and the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal affirmed.97 Under section 95.11(4)(e), the statute of
limitations for a violation of Chapter 517 is two years, and it begins to run
"from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or
should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. '98 The sta-
tute of limitations is not tolled when the plaintiffs "are ignorant of the law on
87. Id.
88. Banco Indus. de Venez., C.A., 21 So. 3d at 48.
89. Id. at 50.
90. Id.
91. Id. (Schwartz, J., specially concurring).
92. Id. at 51 (quoting Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Valdes, 9 So. 3d 17, 18 n.2 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2009)).
93. GLK, L.P. v. Four Seasons Hotel Ltd., 22 So. 3d 635, 636 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2009).
94. Id.
95. Id.; see FLA. STAT. §§ 517.011,517.07(2) (2010).
96. GLK, L.P., 22 So. 3d at 636.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 637 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(e)).
11
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which their claim is based" if they have "all the facts necessary to determine
whether they have a cause of action."99 Purchasers had "the necessary fac-
tual information" by the closing date of the sale in 2004.1°° There was no
concealment of the facts by Sellers because Purchasers "broadly alleged con-
cealment [and] failed to plead fraud with particularity."' 0 ' The delayed dis-
covery doctrine, which applies in cases of fraud, would have delayed accrual
of the statute of limitations only until Purchasers discovered or should have
discovered a violation, and then only if Purchasers were blameless.'0 2 The
Third District Court of Appeal, citing McCullough v. Leede Oil & Gas,
Inc.,1°3 said that the delayed discovery rule is inapplicable here because "[a]
seller of securities cannot conceal the fact that the securities... are not regis-
tered."' 4 The Third District held that Purchasers, having had possession in
2004 of all documents necessary to determine whether Purchasers had a
claim, "cannot be considered blamelessly ignorant and invoke the delayed
discovery rule for their nonregistration claim."
' 0 5
V. CHOICE OF LAW AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
A. Recognition of Out-of-Country Judgment
Agri-Source Fuels, LLC (Buyer), a Florida limited liability company,
with its.principal office in Pensacola, Florida, conducted business in Florida
only. 10 6 Buyer bought steel tanks from a California company.'0 7 The tanks
were in Canada, and Buyer entered into an oral contract with EOS Transport,
Inc. (Transporter), a Canadian company, under which Transporter would
ship the tanks to Florida. 10 8 Buyer never did business in Canada, but there
were numerous communications between Buyer and Transporter regarding
the shipments of the tanks, and payment was to be made in Canada. °9 Buyer
disputed payment for several of the shipments, and Transporter sued Buyer
99. Id. (citing Chidiac v. Cadillac Gage Co., 541 So. 2d 650, 650-51 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1989) (per curiam)).
100. Id.
101. GLK, L.P., 22 So. 3d at 637.
102. Id. (citing Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179, 1184 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam)).
103. 617 F. Supp. 384 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
104. GLK, L.P., 22 So. 3d at 637-38 (quoting McCullough, 617 F. Supp. at 387).
105. Id. at 638.
106. EOS Transp., Inc. v. Agri-Source Fuels L.L.C., 37 So. 3d 349, 351 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2010).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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in the Supreme Court of British Columbia for breach of contract. 110 Buyer
did not defend in Canada, and a default judgment was entered against it.11
Transporter tried to have the judgment recognized under the Florida Uniform
Out-of-Country Foreign Money-Judgment Act, sections 55.601-.607 of the
Florida Statutes. 2 The Escambia County Circuit Court concluded that the
Canadian court did not have personal jurisdiction over Buyer, and the Cana-
dian judgment was held unenforceable." 13 Transporter appealed, and the
First District Court of Appeal affirmed." 14 A mandatory basis for not enforc-
ing a foreign judgment is that the foreign court did not have personal juris-
diction over the defendant. 1 5 Thus, there first needed to be a determination
as to which country's law applies when determining if it was proper for the
foreign court to exercise personal jurisdiction." 6 Second, did the Canadian
court properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Buyer?1 7 The appellate
court observed that the Act does not address which country's law applies in
making the determination of the acquisition of personal jurisdiction, and that
this was an issue that has not been "squarely addressed" by any Florida
court." 8 The First District then discussed two approaches that have been
used in other United States forums where similar statutes were involved." 9
One line of cases first applies the law of the foreign jurisdiction but adds a
due process "'minimum contacts"' requirement.120 The other approach ap-
plies the law of the forum asked to recognize the foreign judgment. 121 The
First District chose the first approach. 122 The necessary minimum contacts
with Canada by Buyer were not found. 123 Purchases made from the forum
state (Canadian) entity and contracting with the forum-state entity, whether
110. Id.
111. EOSTransp., Inc., 37 So. 3dat351.
112. Id. at 351-52 (citing Uniform Out-of-Country Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition
Act, FLA. STAT. § 55.601-607 (2009)).
113. Id. at 351.
114. Id. at 351,355.
115. Id. at 352.
116. EOS Transp., Inc., 37 So. 3d at 352.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. EOS Transp., Inc., 37 So. 3d at 352 (citing Evans Cabinet Corp. v. Kitchen Int'l, Inc.,
593 F.3d 135, 142 n.10 (1st Cir. 2010)).
122. Id. at 352-53.
123. Id. at 354.
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considered separately or together, were not sufficient to establish Buyer's
minimum contacts with Canada.' 24
B. Choice of Law: Provision in Mortgage but Not in Related Note
Mortgagors, who were Florida residents, borrowed against real property
they owned in Georgia. 125 The second mortgage they signed contained a
Georgia choice of law provision. 126 However, the mortgage note they signed
was silent as to choice of law. 27 Mortgagors defaulted on the first and
second mortgages, and the first mortgagee, in Georgia proceedings, forec-
losed on its mortgage. 28 The assignee of the second mortgage and promis-
sory note, New Falls Corporation (Assignee), did not participate in the Geor-
gia proceedings, and its mortgage lien was extinguished.1 29 Assignee did
subsequently bring suit against Mortgagors in the Circuit Court in Miami-
Dade County to enforce the note.' 30 Mortgagors argued that the suit on the
note was time barred by the five-year statute of limitations of section
95.11 (2)(b) of the Florida Statutes for a suit based "on a contract, obligation,
or liability founded on a written instrument."' 31 Assignee contended that the
action was timely instituted, claiming that the Georgia statute of limitations
of six years applied because the choice of law provision in the mortgage also
applied to the note. 132 The trial court found that the Georgia six-year statute
of limitations applied to the note and entered summary judgment in favor of
Assignee. 33 Mortgagors appealed, and the Third District Court of Appeal
reversed. 134 The appellate court agreed with Mortgagors that the Florida
124. Id. (citing Bohlander v. Robert Dean & Assocs. Yacht Brokerage, Inc., 920 So. 2d
1226, 1229 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (per curiam); Aluminator Trailers, L.L.C. v. Load-
master Aluminum Boat Trailers, Inc., 832 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002);
Bruzzone Roldos v. Americargo Lines, Inc., 698 So. 2d 1368, 1370 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (per curiam); Marsh Supermarkets, Inc. v Queen's Flowers Corp., 696 So. 2d 1207,
1209 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
125. Sims v. New Falls Corp., 37 So. 3d 358, 359 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
126. Id. at 360-61.
127. Id. at 360.
128. Id. at 359.
129. Id.
130. Sims, 37 So. 3d at 360. No document other than the promissory note was attached to
Assignee's complaint. Id.
131. Id. at 360 n.2 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 95.1 l(2)(b) (2007)).
132. Id. at 360 n.2, 361. The provision in the mortgage provided that "[t]he state and local
laws applicable to this Deed shall be the laws of the jurisdiction ... [where] the Property is
located." l& at 360 (emphasis added).
133. Sims, 37 So. 3d at 363 (Cope, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 362 (majority opinion).
[Vol. 35
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss1/2
2010] SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW AFFECTING BUSINESS OWNERS 15
statute of limitations applied, and the suit was time-barred. 135 The mortgage
and note were separate documents not to be read in pari-materia.'36 "Florida
follows the doctrine of lex loci contractus," which calls for choosing Flori-
da's law to apply to the promissory note. 37 Justice Cope dissented. 38
VI. CONSUMER RIGHTS
A. Truth in Lending Act Disclosures
Mortgagor was married, but was the sole owner of the couple's princip-
al residence in Florida. 39 Mortgagees loaned money to Mortgagor in 2005
and took back a second mortgage on the homestead. 140 Both Mortgagor and
Mortgagor's wife (Wife) signed the mortgage, but only Mortgagor signed the
mortgage note.' 41 Mortgagor defaulted, and Mortgagees instituted the sub-
ject foreclosure action in 2008.142 In 2006, however, Wife "purportedly ex-
ercised her right to cancel the transaction" because she had not been pro-
vided federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA)143 disclosures. 44 Wife claimed
that she had been entitled to the TILA disclosures and thus "was entitled to
TILA's extended three-year time period for cancellation," and the trial court
agreed, granting summary judgment in favor of Wife in the foreclosure ac-
tion. 145 Mortgagees appealed, taking the position that they were not required
to provide TILA disclosures to Wife because she did not have an "ownership
interest in the property at the time of the mortgage execution."' 46 Thus, the
issue before the Fourth District Court of Appeal was whether Wife qualified
as a "consumer" within the meaning of TILA and Regulation Z promulgated
135. Id.
136. Id. at 364.
137. Id. at 360. The appellate court noted that although Mortgagors were Florida residents
when they signed the note, "they actually signed the documents while traveling to New Jersey,
there [was] no contention made that the place of contract was New Jersey." Sims, 37 So. 3d at
360 n.3.
138. Id. at 362 (Cope, J., dissenting).
139. Gancedo v. Del Carpio, 17 So. 3d 843, 844 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
140. Id. There apparently was no question that the property was in fact Mortgagor's ho-
mestead. Id. at 845.
141. Id. at 844.
142. Id.
143. Truth in Lending Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-321, § 101, 82 Stat. 146, 146 (1968) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006)).
144. Gancedo, 17 So. 3d at 844. Mortgagees did not provide the required disclosures to
either Mortgagor or Wife. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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under TILA by the Federal Reserve Board.'47 Only if Wife so qualified
would she have been entitled to a TWLA disclosure.4 8  To be a consumer,
Wife had to have an ownership interest in the property.'49 The Fourth Dis-
trict, on motion for rehearing, found the necessary ownership interest by rea-
son of Wife's homestead interest under article X, section 4(c) of the Florida
Constitution, and the summary judgment of the trial court was affirmed.' 50
Wife's ownership interest when she signed the mortgage made her a TILA
consumer entitled to disclosure. 5' Wife, therefore, could rescind the mort-
gage transaction and was entitled to the extended rescission period available
in the case of TILA non-disclosure.
5 2
B. Deposit in Escrow
"Whether the escrow deposit requirement of Section 501.1375, Florida
Statutes, applies to general contractors who contract to build a single-family
residence upon land owned by the consumer at the time the contract is
signed" was the question certified by the trial court to the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, as restated by the District Court, in JPG Enterprises, Inc. v.
McLellan.5 3 The Fourth District answered "no" to the question. 15  Section
501.1375 of the Florida Statutes requires "building contractor[s]" and "de-
veloper[s]" of single-family and two-family residences to hold in escrow,
deposits made with them by purchasers-absent a waiver of the requirement
147. Id. Judge May specially concurred to express her concern that the issue of homestead
was "raised for the first time [on the] motion for rehearing." Gancedo, 17 So. 3d at 845 (May,
J., specially concurring). Judge May stated that, while issues not raised in the brief of a party
"are deemed waived and may not be considered for the first time in a motion for rehearing,"
Id. (citing Polyglycoat Corp. v. Hirsch Distribs., Inc., 442 So. 2d 958, 960 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1983)), she pointed out, relying on Dade County School Board. v. Radio Station WQBA,
731 So. 2d 638, 644-45 (Fla. 1999), that "[a]s an appellate court, however, we are obligated to
entertain any basis to affirm the judgment under review, even one the appellee has failed to
argue." Gancedo, 17 So. 3d at 845 (May, J., specially concurring).
148. Gancedo, 17 So. 3d at 844 (majority opinion).
149. Id. at 844-45. Regulation Z defines "consumer" as:
a cardholder or a natural person to whom consumer credit is offered or extended. However,
for purposes of rescission under [sections] 226.15 and 226.23, the term also includes a natural
person in whose principal dwelling a security interest is or will be retained or acquired, if that
person's ownership interest in the dwelling is or will be subject to the security interest.
Id. (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(1 1) (2010)).
150. Id. at 845.
151. Id.
152. Gancedo, 17 So. 3d at 845.
153. 31 So. 3d 821, 822 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis omitted).
154. Id. at 823.
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by the purchaser.'55 The Fourth District emphasized that the statute, in defin-
ing the terms "building contractors" and "developers" for the purpose of the
section 501.1375 escrow provision, used the terms "purchase," "purchaser,"
"purchase price," "sale," and "seller," and in related provisions, referred a
number of times to the "closing., 156 The "plain and ordinary sense" of these
words "refer[s] to the purchase and sale of real property, in addition to" any
structure that might be constructed on the land. 57  The Fourth District
viewed this all as referring to transactions where the builder or developer
was selling lots owned by the builder or developer-with buildings con-
structed or to be constructed on them-and not to transactions where the
purchaser already owned the land.
158
C. FDUTPA Damages
Purchaser, in her fifth amended complaint, alleged that she bought a
2005 Bombardier Sea Doo Sportster (jet-boat), which started burning while
she was riding it and later sank. 159 She sued Recovery Performance & Ma-
rine, LLC (Seller) under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act (FDUTPA)' 60 asking for damages, which she described as her "'down
payment, payments on the loan, interest, [and the] balance on the loan.
' 16 1
Seller successfully moved for summary judgment, Purchaser appealed, 162 and
155. Id. (discussing FLA. STAT. § 501.1375(3) (2008)).
156. ld. at 824.
157. Id.
158. McLellan, 31 So. 3d at 825-26.
159. Rodriguez v. Recovery Performance & Marine, L.L.C., 38 So. 3d 178, 179 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
160. FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201-.213 (2010).
161. Rodriguez, 38 So. 3d at 179.
162. Id. at 180. Purchaser also sought reversal of the trial court's order that denied her
motion to file a sixth amended complaint. Id. at 179-80. Purchaser claimed that the cause of
action contained in the sixth amended complaint-breach of warranty-had not been alleged
in any of the prior complaints, and therefore it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
deny the motion. Id. at 181. The appellate court said that a review of the record showed that
the cause of action had previously been raised in the fourth amended complaint with respect to
which the trial court granted leave to amend. Id. Purchaser subsequently filed a fifth
amended complaint that did not allege breach of warranty. Rodriguez, 38 So. 3d at 181. The
Third District Court of Appeal, quoting its decision in Kohn v. City of Miami Beach, 611 So.
2d 538, 539 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) noted that "'[w]hile there is no magical number of
amendments which are allowed, we have previously observed that with amendments beyond
the third attempt, dismissal with prejudice is generally not an abuse of discretion."' Rodri-
guez, 38 So. 3d at 181 (quoting Kohn, 611 So. 2d at 539). The trial court's denial of Purchas-
er's motion to file a sixth amended complaint was affirmed. Id. at 182.
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the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. 163 Purchaser was asking for
consequential damages, but FDUTPA only allows recovery of actual damag-
es.164 Actual damages, in the context of FDUTPA, are defined by the case
law as "'the difference in the market value of the product... in the condition
in which it was delivered and its market value in the condition in which it
should have been delivered. ' , 165
VII. CONTRACTS
A. Broker's Commission
Business Specialists, Inc. (Broker) alleged that it contracted with Land
& Sea Petroleum, Inc. (Seller) to find a purchaser for Seller's real estate and
business, and that Broker was to be paid a nine percent commission under
the agreement. 166 Seller entered into a written contract to sell the real estate
and business. 167  The contract with the prospective purchaser provided,
among other things, that contract terms regarding Seller's partial financing of
the sale and the contemplated employment by the purchaser of Seller's prin-
cipal remained "'to be negotiated during the due-diligence period."" 168 When
the sale did not close, Broker sued for its commission, alleging that Seller
breached the agreement between Seller and Broker by failing to take certain
required action pursuant to Seller's agreement with the purchaser "during the
due diligence period." 169  Seller's motion for summary judgment was
granted, and Broker appealed. 170 The Fourth District Court of Appeal af-
firmed. 17' An enforceable contract between purchaser and Seller had not
been formed. 172 A meeting of the minds is required for the contract to be an
enforceable contract, and if essential contract terms have not been agreed
upon, there is no meeting of the minds. 173 The Fourth District, citing the
Supreme Court of Florida's decision in David v. Richman,174 held that for
163. Rodriguez, 38 So. 3d at 182.
164. Id. at 180.
165. Id. (quoting Rollins, Inc. v. Heller, 454 So. 2d 580, 585 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1984)).
166. Bus. Specialists, Inc. v. Land & Sea Petroleum, Inc., 25 So. 3d 693, 694-95 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
167. Id. at 695.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 694.
171. Bus. Specialists, Inc., 25 So. 3d at 696.
172. Id. at 695.
173. Id.
174. 568 So. 2d922 (Fla. 1990).
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real estate transactions, terms of financing are essential.'75 The district court
held that not only were the terms of financing essential, but the continued
employment of the seller's principal was also an essential term. 76 Absent an
enforceable sales contract, Broker was not entitled to a commission.177 The
Fourth District affirmed the trial court's order of summary judgment in favor
of Seller, noting that although there were some disputed issues of fact, those
issues "were not genuine issues of material fact" since without an enforcea-
ble contract between Seller and the prospective purchaser, disputes-such as
whether or not Seller complied with its obligations during the due-diligence
time frame-"were not material to the cause of action."'
178
B. Mutuality of Obligation Versus Mutuality of Remedies
Buyers entered into essentially identical contracts with Redington
Grand, LLP (Developer) to buy condominium units. 179 The contracts pro-
vided that if Developer defaulted, Buyers could choose between specific
performance and repayment to them of their deposits, but if a Buyer de-
faulted, Developer could choose between specific performance and liqui-
dated damages to be satisfied by keeping the Buyers' deposits. 80 The ob-
vious difference between the two provisions was that Developer could re-
cover damages upon default, but Buyers could not.18' Developer claimed
that it finished the building on time, but Buyers refused to close. 182 Buyers
then sued Developer to recover their deposits, and Developer counterclaimed
seeking specific performance, or alternatively, an award of damages.'83 On
175. Bus. Specialists, Inc., 25 So. 3d at 695. Broker alleged that the missing financing
terms were agreed to verbally. See id. at 696 n. 1. However, one reason why this did not
matter was that the Statute of Frauds required that those terms be in writing. Id.
176. Id. at 696.
177. Id.
178. Bus. Specialists, Inc., 25 So. 3d at 696.
179. Redington Grand, L.L.P. v. Level 10 Prop., L.L.C., 22 So. 3d 604, 605 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2009).
180. Id. at 606. The contracts required two deposits: one at the inception and the second
when the roof of a unit was finished. Id. at 605-06.
181. Id. at 606.
182. Id. When Developer informed Buyers that the roofs were done, Buyers refused to
pay the additional deposits taking the position that the roofs were not finished. Redington
Grand, L.LP., 22 So. 3d at 606. Buyers requested certain assurances, and when those were
not forthcoming, Buyers declared Developer in default and demanded their deposits be re-
turned to them. Id. Developer did not return the deposits and, prior to the originally agreed
completion date, finished working, obtained certificates of occupancy, and set a closing date
for the originally agreed to completion date. Id.
183. Id. at 606-07.
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cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that "'the
default provisions in the contract[s are] illusory and mutually unenforceable,
as the [Developer] has no real obligation.""' 84 The trial court thus concluded
that the contracts were unenforceable, entered summary judgment for Buy-
ers, and ordered Developer to return Buyers' deposits.'85 Developer ap-
pealed, and the Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.'86
The judgment below confused "mutuality of remedies," which relates to the
method of enforcement, with "mutuality of obligation," which relates to the
issue of consideration for the agreement. 87 Mutuality of obligation is essen-
tial to the formation of a valid contract, but remedies "'may differ without
necessarily affecting the reciprocal obligations of the parties. '"'188 The dis-
trict court concluded that there was no question that "mutuality of obliga-
tion" existed, based on the mutual promises of Developer and Buyers, to sell
and buy the units.'89 The district court also held that even if there had been a
lack of mutuality of obligation initially, complete performance under the
contract by Developer would have cured the lack of mutuality, so that sum-
mary judgment in favor of Buyers would have been error.' ° Furthermore,
Buyers alleged that performance by Developer was not completed, which
may have created a question of material fact which would have precluded the
entry of summary judgment in favor of Buyers.' 9'
C. Indemnification Agreement
Homeowners hired On Target, Inc. (On Target) to find and repair a wa-
ter leak in their home. 9 ' The agreement Homeowners signed with On Target
included an indemnification provision, which stated in part that "[p]roperty
owner.., hereby agrees to hold harmless On Target and On Target Techni-
cians absolutely" with respect to any damages that might be caused by On
Target's work in locating the leak "and to defend same in any action which
184. Id. at 607 (citations omitted).
185. Redington Grand, L.L.P., 22 So. 3d at 607. The court ordered Developer to pay
interest on the deposits from the date of the contracts. Id.
186. Id. at 605, 609.
187. Id. at 608.
188. Id. (quoting Bacon v. Karr, 139 So. 2d 166,169 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962)).
189. Redington Grand, LLP., 22 So. 3d at 608.
190. Id.
191. Id. n.4; see also Bus. Specialists, Inc. v. Land & Sea Petroleum, Inc., 25 So. 3d 693,
695 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
192. On Target, Inc. v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 23 So. 3d 180, 181 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2009).
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may develop pursuant to any of these activities.' ' 93 In doing the work, On
Target found it necessary to drill a hole through a floor tile in the foyer of the
residence. 94 When all the repair work was finished, 95 Homeowners were
not able to find a tile that matched the damaged tile, and in response to the
Homeowners' insurance claim with their insurance carrier, Allstate Floridian
Insurance Company (Insurance Company), Insurance Company approved
retiling the entire foyer at a cost of over $17,000.196 Insurance Company, as
Homeowners' subrogee, then sought to recover that amount from On Target
alleging breach of contract. 197 "On Target answered [the] complaint and
filed a third-party complaint against [Homeowner seeking] indemnifica-
tion."'198 Insurance Company later dismissed its action against On Target,
and On Target then sued Homeowners, seeking attorney fees and costs in-
curred in defense of the subrogation action brought against it by Insurance
Company.' 99 The trial court ruled against On Target, finding the indemnifi-
cation language "vague and ambiguous" and thus not enforceable." On
Target appealed, and the Second District Court of Appeal reversed and re-
manded. 20' A number of cases hold that indemnity agreements will not be
enforced "'to indemnify a party against its own wrongful conduct,"' unless
the agreement so states clearly and unequivocally. 2 2 Here, however, the
indemnification clause was specific enough to enforce.20 3 The district court
193. Id. at 181-82.
194. Id. at 182.
195. Id. On Target's job was to be a temporary fix with permanent repairs to be provided
independently by a plumber. Id.
196. On Target, Inc., 23 So. 3d at 182.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 181-82.
201. On Target, Inc., 23 So. 3d at 181, 186.
202. Id. at 183 (citing Cox Cable Corp. v. Gulf Power Co., 591 So. 2d 627, 629 (Fla.
1992); Charles Poe Masonry, Inc. v. Spring Lock Scaffolding Rental Equip. Co., 374 So. 2d
487, 489 (Fla. 1979); Univ. Plaza Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Stewart, 272 So. 2d 507, 511 (Fla.
1973); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 196 So. 2d 456, 457 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1967)).
203. Id. at 185. The Second District Court of Appeal distinguished the language in the
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 196 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1967), indemnification agreement previously before that court, where the agreement was not
enforced, from the agreement currently under review, saying that in the earlier case, there was
no "reference to indemnifying against the indemnitee's negligence." Id. at 184. The appellate
court also pointed out that the cases, see supra note 202 and accompanying text, all involved
indemnification against negligent acts of the indemnitee, whereas, in the present case, Insur-
ance Company's action alleged breach of contract by On Target, Inc. Id. at 184. Even though
"[t]he parties [did] not address the distinction between this case ... and the other cases ...
21
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stated that "the indemnification provision in [the agreement] puts the
[Homeowner] ... on notice that the [work] may cause limited damage to the
property and that On Target cannot be held liable for damage caused by it in
performing the work that it was hired to do., 2°4 Further, since Insurance
Company's lawsuit against On Target sought relief for damages resulting
from the work done by On Target, in connection with locating the leak, "the
indemnity clause was applicable to On Target's defense of the lawsuit"
brought by Insurance Company. 5
D. Rescission
Seller "transferred" its lease interest, as tenant of certain business pre-
mises, to Buyer as part of the installment purchase by Buyer of Seller's busi-
ness.206 Seller's lease agreement with its landlord provided that Seller could
not assign the lease nor sublet without the landlord's consent, but Seller did
not make written request for consent nor did Seller receive prior written con-
sent from the landlord as required by the terms of the lease.207 Nevertheless,
Buyer took possession of the premises, began doing business there, and made
rent payments directly to the landlord.2 8 The landlord apparently did not
object to Buyer's occupancy of the premises.2°9 After about seven months,
Buyer stopped making rent payments.210 Seller began to pay rent again, gave
Buyer notice to vacate, started eviction proceedings against Buyer, and
sought damages, alleging breach of contract.21' Buyer counterclaimed seek-
ing rescission of the contract based on Seller's failure to obtain the landlord's
[Insurance Company's] complaint could be interpreted as an attempt to plead an intentional
tort" and "[vliewed in this light, [Insurance Company's] complaint does portray On Target's
conduct as 'wrongful." On Target, Inc., 23 So. 3d at 184 (emphasis added). If pleading an
action in negligence was required to bring the case within the rules of the cited decisions, one
might wonder if On Target, Inc., under the broad language of the "indemnification" agree-
ment, could exculpate itself from intentional torts. See, e.g., Loewe v. Seagate Homes, Inc.,
987 So. 2d 758, 760 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Barbara Landau, 2007-2008 Survey of
Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, 33 NOVA L. REv. 81, 127 (2008).
204. On Target, Inc., 23 So. 3d at 185.
205. Id.
206. AVVA-BC, L.L.C. v. Amiel, 25 So. 3d 7, 8-9 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009). The
agreement for sale was a one-page handwritten document. Id. at 8.
207. Id. at 9 n.1.
208. Id. at 9.
209. See id. at 11. The appellate court found that there was conflicting evidence as to
"whether the landlord acquiesced to [Buyer's] tenancy," but it does not appear that either
Buyer or Seller claimed that the Landlord expressly objected to Buyer's presence. Amiel, 25
So. 3d at 12.
210. Id. at 9.
211. Id.
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consent to the lease "assignment., 212 The trial court, on motion for summary
judgment, granted rescission to Buyer.21 3 The Third District Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded.2 4 "'[R]escission will not be granted for breach of
contract, in the absence of fraud, mistake, undue influence, multiplicity of
suits, cloud on title, trust, or some other independent ground for equitable
interference.''25 Further, "rescission will not be granted 'for failure to per-
form a covenant or promise to do an act in the future, unless the covenant
breached is a dependent one."'' 216 The district court explained that a depen-
dent covenant
goes to the whole consideration of the contract; where it is such an
essential part of the bargain that the failure of it must be consi-
dered as destroying the entire contract; or where it is such an in-
dispensable part of what both parties intended that the contract
would not have been made with the covenant omitted.
17
The Third District concluded that the covenant to consent to the as-
signment could not be said to be dependent because the landlord never com-
plained, and the lease assignment was not the "whole consideration," but
rather, it was part of a business purchase agreement.218 In addition, Buyer's
actions over the seven months during which he knew that the landlord's con-
sent had not been obtained amounted to "a waiver of [any] right to res-
cind. ,219 Thus, the summary judgment granting Buyer's request for rescis-
sion was reversed.22° What remained was Buyer's counterclaim that
amounted to a breach of contract claim against Seller.22' The Third District
Court held that summary judgment would not be proper as to Buyer's breach
of contract counterclaim because of the existence of genuine issues of ma-
terial fact.2  Specifically, there remained "a factual dispute regarding
212. Id. at 10.
213. Id.
214. Amiel, 25 So. 3d at 12.
215. Id. at 11 (quoting Richard Bertram & Co. v. Barrett, 155 So. 2d 409, 411-12 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1963)).
216. Id. (quoting Steak House, Inc. v. Barnett, 65 So. 2d 736, 737 (Fla. 1953)).
217. Id. (quoting Steak House, Inc., 65 So. 2d at 738).
218. Id.
219. Amiel, 25 So. 3d at 11.
220. Id. at 12.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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whether the landlord acquiesced to [Buyer's] tenancy, an issue that lies at the
heart of this case.,
223
E. Plain Meaning Rule
Buyers contracted with Sellers to purchase a house that was being con-
structed.224 The purchase price was $620,000, and Buyers made a deposit of
$124,000.22' Buyers insisted on inclusion of a provision that made the con-
tract "'conti[n]gent upon this property appraising for no less than $620,000
to be conducted by a local appraiser.' 226 Prior to closing, Buyers obtained a
local appraisal that valued the property at $560,000.227 Sellers obtained an
appraisal for $635,000.228 Buyers declared the agreement terminated based
on the $560,000 appraisal, and Sellers sued for breach of contract, asking the
trial court to award them liquidated damages, consisting of Buyers' depo-
sit. 229 The trial court considered parol evidence regarding "the parties' intent
and conduct relating to the contingency" and ultimately ruled for Sellers.23°
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded. 3 Parol evi-
dence should not have been allowed because there was nothing ambiguous
about the contract.232 The appellate court concluded that, as the contract was
drafted, Buyers were entitled to walk away from the deal "if any appraisal
valued the property at less than $620,000.,233 Sellers argued that the court
should read the language of the contract "to mean 'contingent upon any ap-
praisal of at least $620,000,"' but the appellate court declined to rewrite the
contract to relieve Seller from the "'apparent hardship of an improvident
bargain.' 2 3
4
223. Id. In addition, if Buyer "abandoned the premises" rather than being forced to leave,
there may have been "no compensable injury" suffered by Buyer, and consequently, no recov-
ery for breach of contract-an element of the cause of action being absent. Amiel, 25 So. 3d
at 12 n.3. And that was not all. Even if there were damages to Buyer, there was still the issue
of mitigation. Id.
224. Gibney v. Pillifant, 32 So. 3d 784, 784 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 785.
229. Gibney, 32 So. 3d at 785.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 786.
232. See id. at 785.
233. Id.
234. Gibney, 32 So. 3d at 785-86 (quoting Beach Resort Hotel Corp. v. Wieder, 79 So. 2d
659, 663 (Fla. 1955) (en banc)).
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F. Latent Versus Patent Ambiguity
Ms. Barrington and Mr. Unger (Agents) entered into contracts to serve
as real estate agents for Gryphon Investments, Inc. doing business as Re/Max
Excellence (Re/Max). 235  Their independent contractor agreements with
Re/Max provided in part, with respect to termination of the agreements, "that
Re/Max 'may retain 25% of the commission earned by [the Agent], above
and beyond the amounts required in this Agreement, to cover [Re/Max's]
costs of bringing the transaction to closure after [the Agent's] termination
date.' ' ' 236  Agents notified Re/Max that they were terminating the agree-
ments, and after the notice, several transactions as to which Agents had pre-
viously been involved went to closing.237 Agents sued Re/Max alleging
breach of contract and failure to pay Agents more than $46,000 due to them,
claiming that Re/Max improperly withheld these amounts as commissions
under the 25% provision in the agreement. 8 The court granted summary
judgment in favor of Re/Max.23 9 Agents appealed, and the Second District
Court of Appeal reversed and remanded. 240 The Second District took the
opportunity to discuss the difference between latent and patent contract am-
biguities. 241 "'[A] patent ambiguity is that which appears on the face of the
instrument and arises from the use of defective, obscure, or insensible lan-
guage."'' 242 A latent ambiguity exists "'where the language employed is clear
and intelligible and suggests but a single meaning, but some extrinsic fact or
extraneous evidence creates a necessity for interpretation or a choice among
two or more possible meanings.' ' 243 A latent ambiguity existed because of
235. Barrington v. Gryphon Invs., Inc., 32 So. 3d 668, 669 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. The claim for $46,221.39 is a summation of $18,550.07 from Barrington and
$27,671.32 from Unger. Id.
239. Barrington, 32 So. 3d at 670.
240. Id. at 670-71.
241. Id. The Second District Court of Appeal believed that the agreement contained a
patent ambiguity because of what it considered two conflicting provisions. Id. at 670. One
provision allowed Re/Max to retain, after termination of the agreements, 25% of the commis-
sion that the Agents earned. Id. However, a later provision said that the retaining of the
commissions was to cover the costs of completing the transactions. Barrington, 32 So. 3d at
670. Thus, noted the appellate court, it was unclear whether Re/Max could keep the full 25%
even if the actual costs were less than the full 25%. Id. But since "Agents did not raise this
specific issue, it is not before us," the court said. Id.
242. Id. (quoting Crown Mgmt. Corp. v. Goodman, 452 So. 2d 49, 52 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984)).
243. Id. at 670-71 (quoting Mac-Gray Servs., Inc. v. Savannah Assocs. of Sarasota,
L.L.C., 915 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005)).
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evidence submitted by affidavit on the motion for summary judgment to the
effect that Re/Max had not withheld the full 25% in other instances, suggest-
ing that perhaps it was not the intent of the parties to withhold the full 25% if
actual costs of completing Agents' transactions were not that much.
24
Summary judgment should not have been granted in the face of the latent
ambiguity.245 "'[W]hen an agreement contains a latent ambiguity, . . . the
issue of the correct interpretation of the agreement is an issue of fact which
,,,24624precludes summary judgment. Judge Kelly dissented.247
VIII. DEEDS, MORTGAGES, AND LIS PENDENS
A. Mortgage Foreclosure: Appointment of Receiver
Lender held a mortgage on rental real estate, and when the mortgage
went into default, the trial court ordered that Borrower (Landlord) comply
with the assignment of rents clause in the mortgage. 248 This order, entered in
January 2009, directed Borrower to use the rents only for the property's
maintenance and operation. 249 Any rents not needed for those purposes were
to go into the court registry.25° Borrower was also to provide monthly ac-
countings to Lender and the court.251 Two months later, Lender, by emer-
252gency motion, asked the court to appoint a receiver. Although there was
no dispute about Borrower's failure to comply with the court's order,253 the
254trial court refused Lender's emergency request for a receiver. Lender ap-
255pealed, and the Third District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.
First, Lender demonstrated substantial likelihood of success on the merits of
its case, a prerequisite for the appointment of a receiver. 6 In addition, in a
244. Barrington, 32 So. 3d at 671.
245. Id.
246. Id. (quoting Mac-Gray Servs., Inc., 915 So. 2d at 659-60).
247. Id. at 671-72 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
248. Keybank Nat'l Ass'n v. Knuth Ltd., 15 So. 3d 939, 940 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
The order was entered in January 2009 but was made retroactive to December 15, 2008. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. KeybankNat'IAss'n, 15 So. 3d at 940.
253. Id. No rents had been deposited into the court registry, and no accountings had been
given with respect to the three-month period between the December 2008 effective date of the
court's order and the March hearing on the emergency motion seeking appointment of a re-
ceiver. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 940-4 1.
256. Keybank Nat'l Ass'n, 15 So. 3d at 940.
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mortgage default setting, if additional security is given in the form of a
pledge of rents, a receiver should be appointed upon application if the rents
are not being applied to the mortgage, unless the mortgagor makes it clear
that the mortgaged real estate "'will sell for enough to pay the debt and
charges due the mortgagee"' and the mortgagor establishes "'that there is no
equitable need to disturb the [mortgagor's] possession. '257 The mortgagor
failed to do so. 258 The fact that the trial court had issued a contempt show
cause order to the mortgagor was not a substitute for the appointment of a
receiver.259
B. Mortgage Foreclosure: Disposition of Cash Surplus
Mortgagor owned real estate subject to a first mortgage held by Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. (First Mortgagee) and to a second mortgage held by Mr.
Suarez (Second Mortgagee).26 Mortgagor defaulted on both mortgages, and
in September 2007, a notice of lis pendens was filed by First Mortgagee,
followed by the filing in January 2008 of foreclosure action naming Mortga-
gor and Second Mortgagee as defendants.261 On the date of the filing of the
lis pendens notice, Mortgagor owned the property.262 Beginning approx-
imately two months after First Mortgagee's filing of its lawsuit, Second
Mortgagee started an independent suit against Mortgagor to foreclose the
second mortgage, obtained a final judgment of foreclosure, bought the prop-
erty at the foreclosure sale, and received a certificate of title to the property
from the Clerk of the Circuit Court. 263 This title was, of course, subject to
First Mortgagee's mortgage. 264 Then there was another foreclosure sale after
First Mortgagee obtained its judgment of foreclosure, and Second Mortgagee
again purchased the property. 265 This foreclosure sale resulted in a surplus of
over $20,000, and both Mortgagor and Second Mortgagee claimed the sur-
plus.266 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. 267 Section 45.032(l)(a)
257. Id. at 940 (alteration in original) (quoting Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Baum-
gartner, 128 So. 241, 249-50 (Fla. 1930), superseded by statute, Act effective July 1, 1993,
ch. 93-88, § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 468)).
258. Id. at 941.
259. Id.
260. Suarez v. Edgehill, 20 So. 3d 410,410 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 410-11.
264. Id. at 411. On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal noted, "There is no issue in
this appeal regarding disposition of the proceeds from that sale." Suarez, 20 So. 3d at 410.
265. Id. at 411.
266. Id.
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of the Florida Statutes, as amended in 2006, provides that, for purposes of
disposition of foreclosure surplus, the "'owner of record' of the property is
defined as "'the person or persons who appear to be owners"' on the date the
lis pendens is filed.268 Entitlement of the owner of record to the surplus after
subordinate liens have been satisfied is a rebuttable legal presumption.269
Here, Second Mortgagee was unable to overcome the presumption on any
basis set forth in the statute as grounds for rebutting the presumption.27 °
Second Mortgagee was the owner of the property at the time of the First
Mortgagee's foreclosure sale, but that is not what the statute requires.27 To
overcome the presumption, Second Mortgagee had to prove that he was a
"grantee or assignee" of the right to the surplus as the result of an involunta-
ry transfer or assignment such as by inheritance or the appointment of a
guardian.272 The Third District emphasized several times that the legislature
"abrogate[ed] 'the common law rule that surplus proceeds in a foreclosure
case are the property of the owner of the property on the date of the foreclo-
sure sale."1'
2 73
C. Mortgage Foreclosure: Payment of Condominium Assessments
Is a mortgagee liable for monthly condominium assessments during fo-
reclosure proceedings on a condominium unit? In U.S. Bank National Ass'n
v. Tadmore,274 the Third District Court of Appeal said no, even though there
had been more than a year's delay in the activity of record with respect to the
litigation.275 The trial court had entered an order that the Mortgagee proceed
with the foreclosure action within thirty days, and if it did not, it would be
required to pay the monthly condominium assessments on the unit in-
volved. 76 The Third District reversed because the condominium association
conceded that the Mortgagee was not contractually obligated to pay the as-
sessments, and section 718.116(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes requires such
payments only after title is acquired. 277 The Third District, quoting the Su-
267. Id. at 412.
268. Id. at 411 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 45.032(1)(a) (2008)).
269. Suarez, 20 So. 3d at 411 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 45.032(2) (2008)).
270. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 45.033(2)(b) (2008)).
271. Id.
272. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 45.033(2)(b) (2008)).
273. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. §§ 45.032(2), .033(1) (2008)).
274. 23 So. 3d 822 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
275. Id. at 823.
276. Id. at 822.
277. Id. at 823. Nor, as confirmed by section 718.116(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes, is the
mortgagee legally obligated to do so before obtaining title:
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preme Court of Florida in Flagler v. Flagler,278 said that "'courts of equity
have [no] right or power under the law of Florida to issue such order[s] it
considers to be in the best interest of 'social justice' at the particular moment
without regard to established law."' 279 Several months later, when the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Coral Key
Condominium Ass'n (at Carolina)20 was presented with the same question as
the Third District, the Fourth District, relying on U.S. Bank National Ass'n
and section 718.116(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes, also said no.28 1
A related issue involving unpaid common expenses that accrued or
came due prior to the mortgagee's acquisition of title to the mortgaged prop-
erty was presented to the Second District Court of Appeal in Coral Lakes
Community Ass'n v. Busey Bank, N.A.282 In 2006, Busey Bank (Mortgagee)
loaned the Mortgagors over $250,000 for the purchase of property in Coral
Lakes, and the loan was secured by a first mortgage and note.283 Mortgagors
were behind in their payments toward the mortgage and note as well as on
homeowners' association (the Association) assessments.2 4 Mortgagee filed
suit naming Mortgagors and the Association as defendants, and Mortgagee
successfully foreclosed on Mortgagors' property.285 The Association sought
to collect its past due assessments on the property from the Mortgagee.286
Although section 720.3085(2) of the Florida Statutes, which became effec-
tive in 2007, would, on its face, seem to dispose of the matter, there was a
question of the constitutionality of retroactive application of the statute.287
Section 720.3085(2) provides that mortgages are subordinate to the claims
for common expense assessments-with a cap provided by the statute.
288
(b) The liability of a first mortgagee . . . who acquire[s] title to a unit by foreclosure or by
deed in lieu of foreclosure for the unpaid assessments that become due prior to the mortgagee's
acquisition of title is limited to the lesser of: 1. The unit's unpaid common expenses and regu-
larly periodic assessments which accrued or came due during the [six] months immediately
preceding the acquisition of title... or 2. One percent of the original mortgage debt ....
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(b) (2009)).
278. 94 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1957) (en banc).
279. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 23 So. 3d at 824 (quoting Flagler, 94 So. 2d at 594).
280. 32 So. 3d 195 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
281. Id. at 196. The trial court, in Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. had, like the trial
court in U.S. Bank National Ass'n, ruled that it was only "fair and equitable" to require the
mortgagee to pay monthly assessments if the foreclosure proceedings were delayed without
good reason. Id. at 195.
282. 30 So. 3d 579, 581 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 581,583.
286. Id. at 582.
287. Coral Lakes Cmty. Ass'n, 30 So. 3d at 583.
288. FLA. STAT. § 720.3085(2)(a), (c) (2010).
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The Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions of Coral Lakes Community
Ass'n, Inc. (the Declaration), on the other hand, contained a provision that
subordinated claims for unpaid homeowners' association assessments to a
first mortgagee's claim upon foreclosure or deed in lieu of foreclosure.
2 8 9
The trial court held that the Declaration trumped the statute and ruled for
Mortgagee. 290 The Second District affirmed, concluding that "[t]o hold oth-
erwise would implicate constitutional concerns about impairment of vested
contractual rights."29'
D. Mortgage Foreclosure: Right to Statutory Attorney Fees
The Coastal Community Bank (Mortgagee) brought a foreclosure ac-
tion, and the Mortgagors defaulted.292 Mortgagee, relying on the attorney's
fee provisions in the note securing the mortgage, then sought attorney's fees
of ten percent of the principal amount remaining on the promissory note.293
The note provided that "'reasonable attorneys' fees shall be construed to
mean 10% of the principal sum named in this note."'' 294 The trial court found
the 10% amount to be "unconscionable" and refused to enforce the attorney's
fee provision of the promissory note. 95 Mortgagee did not put on any evi-
dence regarding the claimed fees and instead on appeal relied on section
687.06 of the Florida Statutes.2 96 This section states in part that "'it shall not
be necessary for the court to adjudge an attorney's fee, provided in any note
or other instrument of writing, to be reasonable and just, when such fee does
not exceed [ten] percent of the principal sum named in said note, or other
instrument in writing.',, 297 However, "'unconscionability is an affirmative
defense' that Mortgagors were required to raise in responsive pleadings, but
Mortgagors, having defaulted, did not raise the defense.298 On the other
hand, the attorney's fee statute did not prevent the trial court from requiring
289. Coral Lakes Cmty. Ass'n, 30 So. 3d at 581.
290. Id. at 583-584.
291. Id. at 584. The Association, in addition to arguing that the 2007 statute took priority
over the Declaration, also argued that the revision of the statute in 2007 had the effect of re-
writing the Declaration. Id. at 585 n.6. The Second District Court of Appeal said that it was
not commenting on that argument since the argument "was not the basis of the trial court's
summary judgment." Id.
292. See Coastal Cmty. Bank v. Jones, 23 So. 3d 757, 758 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
293. Id.
294. Id. (quoting language from the promissory note at issue in the case).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Coastal Cmiy. Bank, 23 So. 3d at 758 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 687.06 (2008)).
298. Id. at 759.
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evidence showing an entitlement to a fee; that is, evidence that Mortgagee
had paid its attorney any fees.2 99 Therefore, the First District Court of Ap-
peal affirmed the trial court but "[not] because the fee was unreasonable or
unjust. ' '30° Instead, the court "affirm[ed] because [Mortgagee] declined to
demonstrate at all the fee due from it to its lawyers. '' 0 '
IX. EMINENT DOMAIN
M & H Profit, Inc. (M & H) bought property that was not subject to any
city restrictions as to height or setback.302 About six weeks later, the City of
Panama City (the City) enacted an ordinance that imposed such restrictions
in the zoning district where M & H's newly-purchased property was lo-
cated.3°3 When the City passed the ordinance, M & H had not yet applied to
the City for development approval. 304 There were informal discussions be-
tween M & H and the City Planning Manager to the effect that M & H's in-
tended use would not satisfy the new restrictions.3 °5 M & H sued the City for
damages under section 70.001 of the Florida Statutes, the Bert Harris Act
(the Act).306 The trial court granted the City's motion to dismiss, and M & H
appealed.30 7 In M & H Profit, Inc., the First District Court of Appeal was
called upon to decide for the first time:
[W]hether a property owner can state a cause of action under...
[the Bert Harris Act], based upon mere adoption of an ordinance of
general applicability pursuant to the police powers of a city in a
situation where that municipality has taken no further action con-
cerning application of the ordinance to a particular piece of proper-
ty.3
08
The First District affirmed. 309 The Act only compensates owners who
suffer economic loss from the actual application of the regulation com-
299. See id.
300. Id. The district court declined to address the issue of the reasonableness of the fee
since no amount was shown as having been paid. Id.
301. Coastal Cmty. Bank, 23 So. 3d at 759.
302. M & H Profit, Inc. v. City of Panama City, 28 So. 3d 71, 73 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App.
2009).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 74.
307. M & H Profit, Inc., 28 So. 3d at 74.
308. Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
309. Id. at 78.
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plained of to an owner's property.310 Here, there had been no specific appli-
cation of the zoning ordinance to M & H's property because M & H had not
submitted a development plan for the property and been turned down. 3 1' The
Act did not change any "land use classification or zoning category [with re-
spect to] any particular piece of property."'3 12 "District-wide height and set-
back restrictions are normally considered" related to the general welfare.
31 3
M & H brought only a "facial challenge" to the ordinance when what was
required to sustain its position was an "as-applied" challenge to the ordin-
ance.314 Judge Thomas dissented, saying that "[tjhe Act establishes broad
protection for property owners who suffer economic loss from governmental
property regulations and actions that attempt to impose societal costs onto
property owners .... It seems quite clear to me that this legislation has not
excluded an ordinance of general applicability ....,,35 Judge Thomas con-
cluded that the court "must simply enforce the plain terms of the statute."
31 6
X. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Benefits Accrued Prior to Termination of an At-Will Employee
Mr. Patwary (Employee) entered into a contract with Evana Petroleum
Corporation (Corporation) that provided, among other things, that Employee
would manage a motel for Corporation in exchange for half of the motel's
net profits, and should the motel be sold during the term of the agreement,
Employee would receive half of the net sale proceeds.317 In December 2001,
Employee was told that a contract had been made to sell the motel.3 18 In
January 2002, Corporation fired Employee without prior notice.31 9 The mo-
tel sale was completed, and Corporation refused to pay Employee any part of
the net sale proceeds or any accrued net profits.32' Employee sued to collect,
and the trial court, on motion for summary judgment regarding these claims,
310. Id. at 76.
311. Id. at 73, 76.
312. M&HProfit, Inc., 28 So. 3dat74.
313. Id. (citing WCI Cmtys., Inc. v. City of Coral Springs, 885 So. 2d 912, 915 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 349 So. 2d 667, 669
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
314. See id. at 74-76.
315. Id. at 79 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
316. Id.
317. Patwary v. Evana Petroleum Corp., 18 So. 3d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2009).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
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held that Employee's "claim was barred because it concerned . . . an agree-
ment without a definite duration. 3 2' The Second District Court of Appeal
reversed as to denial of the claim and remanded.3 22 It was true that Employee
worked as an employee at-will, and thus could not maintain an action for
wrongful employment termination.3 23  However, an employment at-will
agreement does not bar recovery of employee compensation and benefits
earned prior to termination.324
B. Covenant Not to Compete: Attorney's Fees Against Third Party
Section 542.335(1)(k) of the Florida Statutes was at issue in Bauer v.
Dilib, Inc.325 This section states that "'[i]n the absence of a contractual pro-
vision authorizing an award of attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing
party, a court may award attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party in
any action seeking enforcement of, or challenging the enforceability of, a
restrictive covenant.' ' 326 Dilib, Inc. (Former Employer) had a written non-
compete agreement with two of its employees.3 7 The two employees were
found by the trial court to have violated the agreement by going to work for
Ms. Bauer (New Employer).32 8 There was evidence to the effect that New
Employer knew of the non-compete agreement, although New Employer
denied this. 329 Former Employer succeeded in obtaining a permanent injunc-
tion against New Employer forbidding New Employer from associating with
the two employees for a certain period of time. 330 New Employer then fired
the two employees. 331 The trial court awarded Former Employer attorney's
fees against New Employer based on section 542.335(l)(k). 32 New Em-
ployer appealed the fee award, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal re-
versed.333 The cited section cannot be read in isolation; it must be read to-
gether with section 542.335(l)(a), which provides that a restrictive covenant
321. Id.
322. Patwary, 18 So. 3d at 1239.
323. Id. at 1238-39 (citing De Felice v. Moss Mfg., Inc., 461 So. 2d 209, 210 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (per curium)).
324. Id. at 1238.
325. 16 So. 3d 318, 319 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
326. Id. at 319 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(k) (2007)).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See id.
330. Bauer, 16 So. 3d at 319.
331. Id. at 319.
332. Id. at 320.
333. Id. at 320, 322.
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can only be enforced against a person who signs it.334 Obviously, New Em-
ployer did not sign the agreement, and since the restrictive covenant could
not be enforced against New Employer, Former Employer could not recover
its attorney's fees from New Employer.335 Although the restrictive covenant
could not be enforced against New Employer, as a third party, an injunction
is a proper remedy if that party "aids and abets the violation of a restrictive
covenant, ' 336 provided there is proper notice and "'an opportunity to be
heard.' ' 337 The power to order injunctive relief in such cases derives from
common law, not from section 542.335.338 Thus, in the absence of a contrac-
tual fee agreement or a statute permitting a fee award, there was no basis to
grant fees in connection with the injunction against New Employer. 339
XI. FIDUCIARY DUTY AND GOVERNANCE
Karten (Plaintiff) and Woltin and Karmin (Defendants) were the share-
holders of 201 East Atlantic, Inc. (the Corporation).3 ° Plaintiff owned 25%
of the stock, and Defendants owned the remaining 75%.341 The Corporation
was in the restaurant business.342 Plaintiff sued Defendants for breach of
fiduciary duty, alleging that Defendants: 1) went into a competing restaurant
and bar business but failed to give Plaintiff the chance to become an owner;
2) diverted the Corporation's assets to the competing business; 3) prevented
Plaintiff from carrying out his responsibilities as a corporate officer and di-
rector; 4) agreed to "deprive" Plaintiff of his share of corporate profits; and
5) agreed to pay one of the Defendants a salary that was excessive.343 Plain-
tiff alleged that only he-that is, no other shareholder-was harmed by the
conduct of Defendants.' Defendants contended that Plaintiff's claims could
only be pursued as a shareholder's derivative action under section 607.07401
of the Florida Statutes because Plaintiff did not "allege injuries separate and
334. Id at 320; FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(a) (2010).
335. Bauer, 16 So. 3d at 320.
336. Id. at 320-21.
337. Id. (quoting USI Ins. Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Pettineo, 987 So. 2d 763, 767 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
338. Id. at 321.
339. Id. at 320.
340. Karten v. Woltin, 23 So. 3d 839, 840 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). The Corporation
was not made a party to the action. Id. at 840 n. 1.
341. Id. at 840.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Karten, 23 So. 3d at 840.
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distinct from those suffered by all other shareholders. ' 35  The trial court
agreed, granting summary judgment to Defendants, and Plaintiff appealed. 346
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed.347 Shareholders may only sue
directly in their own names for an injury done to them individually.34 A lost
business opportunity is an injury to the corporation, and the injury affects all
of the corporation's shareholders. 9 The district court concluded that Plain-
tiff's allegations were not of "the type of individualized harm" that would
permit him to sue directly rather than derivatively.35°
XII. INSURANCE
The Supreme Court of Florida was presented with a question certified to
it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concerning
insurance coverage for violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA)."' Transportation Insurance Company (Insurance Company) issued
a policy to Penzer's assignor, its insured, providing the insured with cover-
age for, among other things, "[o]ral or written publication of material that
violates a person's right of privacy. 352 The TCPA imposes monetary penal-
ties on those who send unsolicited advertisements to fax machines. 3  The
offending incident in question occurred when the insured was allegedly in-
strumental in the transmission of 24,000 "blast-fax" advertisements.3 4 In-
surance Company denied coverage under its policy, and Penzer sued seeking
declaratory relief.355 The Southern District Court of Florida ruled for Insur-
ance Company, and Penzer appealed.356 The Court of Appeals for the Ele-
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 841.
348. Id. at 840 (citing Fort Pierce Corp. v. Ivey, 671 So. 2d 206, 207 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)).
349. Karten, 23 So. 3d at 841 (citing Braun v. Buyers Choice Mortg. Corp., 851 So. 2d
199, 203 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
350. Id. (citing Orlinsky v. Patraka, 971 So. 2d 796, 801-02 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007));
see also Barbara Landau, 2006-2007 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, 32
NOVA L. REv. 21, 78-79 (2007).
351. Penzer v. Transp. Ins. Co., 29 So. 3d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 2010), answering certified
question from 545 F.3d 1303 (1 1th Cir. 2008).
352. Id. at 1003.
353. Id. at 1003 n.2; Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, §
3, 105 Stat. 2394, 2396 (1991) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2006).
354. Penzer, 29 So. 3d at 1007.
355. Id. at 1003.
356. Id. at 1004.
35
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venth Circuit then certified the question.357 The Supreme Court of Florida
ruled that the quoted policy coverage did apply to the alleged violation of the
TCPA.358 The unwanted fax advertisement intruded on the recipient's soli-
tude and was thus a privacy violation.359 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Pariente wrote that Insurance Company could have avoided liability for the
mere act of sending the faxes if the coverage clause had instead read: "Oral
or written publication of material, the content of which violates the right of
privacy.
31
XII. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE INTERNET
In Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall,3 61 the Supreme Court of Florida
answered a long-arm jurisdiction question certified to it by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.362 As rephrased by the Supreme
Court of Florida, the question was as follows:
Does a nonresident commit a tortious act within Florida for pur-
poses of section 48.193(1)(b) when he or she makes allegedly de-
famatory statements about a company with its principal place of
business in Florida by posting those statements on a website,
where the website posts containing the statements are accessible
and accessed in Florida?363
The Supreme Court of Florida answered yes.364 Defendant, a Washing-
ton resident, owned and operated a noncommercial website on which she
posted consumer information that allegedly defamed Plaintiff.3 65 Plaintiff, a
Nevada corporation engaged in the employment, recruiting, and advertising
business, alleged that its principal place of business was in Orlando, Florida,
and claimed that Defendant had defamed it by posting on her website claims
of illegal conduct by Plaintiff.366 The issue was whether Defendant had en-
gaged in activity sufficient to subject her to personal jurisdiction in Florida
357. Id. at 1005.
358. Id. at 1008.
359. Penzer, 29 So. 3d at 1007.
360. Id. at 1009 (Pariente, J., concurring in result only).
361. 39 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2010), answering certified question from 557 F.3d 1293 (1 1th
Cir. 2009).
362. Id. at 1203.
363. Id. (emphasis omitted).
364. Id.
365. Id. at 1203-04.
366. Internet Solutions Corp., 39 So. 3d at 1203-04.
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under section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes.36 The Supreme Court of Flori-
da stated that:
[P]osting defamatory material on a website alone does not consti-
tute the commission of a tortious act within Florida for purposes of
section 48.193(1)(b), [of the] Florida Statutes. Rather, the materi-
al posted on the website about a Florida resident must not only be
accessible in Florida, but also be accessed in Florida in order to
constitute the commission of the tortious act of defamation within
Florida under section 48.193(1)(b).368
It is the accessing of the information that constitutes the publication element
of defamation-and the communication of the material into Florida-and
thus the commission of the tortious act within Florida. 369 The Supreme Court
of Florida was careful to point out that it dealt with only the first part of the
personal jurisdiction inquiry.37° The second part, a "minimum contacts"
analysis, which requires that a court determine if its exercise of personal ju-
risdiction would offend due process, was beyond what the Eleventh Circuit
asked of the Supreme Court of Florida in this case.37'
XIV. JURISDICTION, VENUE, FORUM NON CONVENIENS, AND STANDING
A. Long-Arn Jurisdiction
In Internet Solutions Corp., the previous case discussed, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified a long-arm jurisdic-
tion question to the Supreme Court of Florida that arose in the tort context.372
In Canale v. Rubin,373 the issue of communications into Florida was again
presented, but in the context of a breach of contract claim.374 The case pro-
vided the Second District Court of Appeal with the opportunity to discuss the
requirements for both general and specific personal jurisdiction under the
367. Id. at 1205.
368. Id. at 1203.
369. Id. at 1215.
370. Id. at 1216.
371. Internet Solutions Corp., 39 So. 3d at 1216.
372. Id. at 1203; see supra note 363 and accompanying text.
373. 20 So. 3d 463 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
374. Id. at 465. The amended verified complaint contained allegations sounding in tort as
well as breach of contract. Id. However, the court held that it would be the defendant's
"communications" into Florida that were alleged to form a basis for jurisdiction based on
section 48.193(l)(a), conducting a business in Florida, under the "specific jurisdiction" rules.
Id. at 469.
37
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long-arm statute, in addition to "minimum contacts" and burden of proof.37
With respect to the two types of long-arm personal jurisdiction that could
apply to this breach of contract case, specific and general, as described in
sections 48.193(1)376 and 48.193(2)1 7 of the Florida Statutes, the district
court noted that general jurisdiction is the more difficult to prove.378 General
jurisdiction must be established by proving that "the defendant engages in
substantial and not isolated activities in Florida. 3 79  General jurisdiction
subjects the defendant to any claim brought in Florida.38 ° General jurisdic-
tion activities alleged to have taken place in Florida are unrelated to a specif-
375. See id. at 465, 469. One of the contracts involved provided that Florida law applied,
and the parties consented to exclusive jurisdiction in Sarasota, Florida. Canale, 20 So. 3d at
468. The district court said that "[n]o one appears to dispute these facts." Id. See Barbara
Landau, 2008-2009 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, 34 NOVA L. REV. 71,
121-24 (2009) [hereinafter Landau, 2008-2009 Survey], regarding the impact of such a provi-
sion under section 48.193, as well as under sections 685.101 and 685.102, of the Florida
Statutes.
376. Section 48.193(1) of the Florida Statutes provides in relevant part:
Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an
agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself
and, if he or she is a natural person, his or her personal representative to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts:
(a) Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this
state or having an office or agency in this state. (b) Committing a tortious act within this state.
(c) Owning, using, possessing, or holding a mortgage or other lien on any real property within
this state. (d) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the
time of contracting. (e) With respect to a proceeding for alimony, child support, or division of
property in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage or with respect to an independent
action for support of dependents, maintaining a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of
the commencement of this action or, if the defendant resided in this state preceding the com-
mencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. This paragraph does not
change the residency requirement for filing an action for dissolution of marriage. (f) Causing
injury to persons or property within this state arising out of an act or omission by the defendant
outside this state, if, at or about the time of the injury, either: 1. The defendant was engaged in
solicitation or service activities within this state; or 2. Products, materials, or things processed,
serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state
in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use. (g) Breaching a contract in this state by fail-
ing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. (h) With respect to a
proceeding for paternity, engaging in the act of sexual intercourse within this state with respect
to which a child may have been conceived.
FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1) (2007).
377. Section 48.193(2) of the Florida Statutes provides that "[a] defendant who is engaged
in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly inter-
state, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether
or not the claim arises from that activity." Id. § 48.193(2).
378. Canale, 20 So. 3d at 466.
379. Id. at 465-66.
380. Id. at 466 (citing Christus St. Joseph's Health Sys. v. Witt Biomedical Corp., 805 So.
2d 1050, 1052 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
38
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ic lawsuit.38' On the other hand, specific jurisdiction only requires proof that
the defendant was "'operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a
business or business venture in [Florida]. ' '382 Specific jurisdiction contem-
plates isolated acts by the defendant, involving the plaintiff in the lawsuit,
with the cause of action arising from one of the statutorily enumerated acts in
section 48.193(1).383 The district court noted that the trial court found specif-
ic personal jurisdiction on account of the defendant having "'made and re-
ceived hundreds of business telephone calls to and from Florida, and en-
gaged in ongoing facsimile and email communication with Florida.' 38 4 The
problem with this finding was that communications to Florida would be per-
tinent to a tort claim against the defendant, rather than the contract claim
involved in this case, based on doing business here.385
Jaffe & Hough, P.C. v. Baine,386 which is also a long-arm jurisdiction
case, is another example of the evidentiary burden-shifting involved in estab-
lishing--or failing to establish-personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant.387 Mr. and Mrs. Baine (Clients) of Polk County, Florida, retained
Jaffe & Hough, P.C. (Law Firm), a Philadelphia law firm, to represent them
in a products liability claim against Bausch & Lomb, Inc. (Defendants).388
Clients signed the attorney fee agreement in Pennsylvania.389 Clients dis-
charged Law Firm and replaced it with Polk County counsel before suing
Defendants.3 90 Clients sued Defendants in Polk County, and they eventually
settled the lawsuit.39' Law Firm learned of the settlement and asked Defen-
dants "to hold distribution of the settlement mon[ey]" to Clients until Law
Firm's lien issues could be resolved.392 Clients responded by suing Law
Firm in the Polk County Circuit Court to determine its "charging lien. 393
Law Finn moved to dismiss the Polk County action arguing that Clients had
381. Id. (citing Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1516 n.7 (1 th Cir. 1990)).
382. Id. at 468 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(a) (2007)).
383. See Canale, 20 So. 3d at 466.
384. Id. at 468.
385. Id. (citing Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1260 (Fla. 2002)). It was these types
of activities-telephone, electronic, and facsimile transmission-that the Court reviewed in
Internet Solutions Corp. in arriving at its decision involving internet transmission of material
in the tort context. Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1215-16 (Fla. 2010),
answering certified question from 557 F.3d 1293 (1 1th Cir. 2009).
386. 29 So. 3d 456 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
387. Id. at 459.
388. Id. at 457-58.
389. Id. at 458.
390. Id.
391. Jaffe & Hough, P.C., 29 So. 3d at 458.
392. Id.
393. Id.
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failed to establish personal jurisdiction over Law Firm.394 The trial judge
denied the motion, and Law Firm appealed.39 5 The Second District reversed
and remanded.396 The appellate court succinctly described the hurdles that
Clients needed to overcome before Law Firm could successfully and perso-
nally be brought before a Florida tribunal, all in the manner described by
Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais,397 Kin Yong Lung Industries Co. v. Tem-
ple,398 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,3 and section 48.193 of
the Florida Statutes:4 °
(1) Plaintiff must allege jurisdictional facts sufficient to bring the out-
of-state defendant into a Florida court under section 48.193. 401
(2) Plaintiff must then allege that "defendant possesses [enough] mini-
mum contacts with Florida to satisfy constitutional due process require-
ments," at which point, the court must rule as to whether the defendant has
been doing business in Florida, or acted in such manner that it could antic-
ipate having to answer for its actions in a Florida court.4°2
(3) The burden then shifts to defendant to come up with evidence
putting the accuracy of the jurisdictional facts plead by plaintiff at issue.403
Clients failed to plead enough facts to subject Law Firm to personal ju-
risdiction in Florida.4°
In the next case, Singer v. Unibilt Development Co.,405 the Fifth District
Court of Appeal concluded that foreign entities that were no longer engaged
in business in Florida were subject to the jurisdiction of the Florida court.4°6
At issue in Singer was whether Florida's "general" personal jurisdiction
long-arm statute, section 48.193(2), applied to the plaintiff's lawsuit against
Michigan entities-a limited partnership and its corporate general partners-
so as to allow plaintiff to sue the foreign partnership and its foreign general
partners in Florida.407 The trial court said no because at the time suit was
filed, the evidence did not support a finding that the entities were engaged in
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Jaffe & Hough, P.c., 29 So. 3d at 461.
397. 554 So. 2d 499, 501-02 (Fla. 1989).
398. 816 So. 2d 663, 666 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
399. 444 U.S. 286, 291-292 (1980).
400. Jaffe & Hough, P.C., 29 So. 3d at 458-59; see FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2008).
401. Jaffe & Hough, P.C., 29 So. 3d at 458.
402. Id. (quoting Venetian Salami Co., 554 So. 2d at 500).
403. Id. at 459.
404. Id. at 457.
405. 43 So. 3d 784 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
406. Id. at 789.
407. Id. at 786.
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"substantial business activity" in Florida.4°8 The trial court found that the
entities "had ceased all activity in Florida," 4°9 and relied on the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal's decision in Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, LLP
v. Kar Kare Automotive Group, Inc. 410 The Fifth District reversed, conclud-
ing that the Fourth District had construed the statutory phrase "is engaged in
substantial ... activity" in the present tense, requiring that the defendant be
currently" engaged in substantial business activity. The Fifth District
refused to construe the statute "this narrowly," noting that the partnership in
this case: (1) was established to develop residential property in Orange
County, (2) carried on business activities in Florida for twenty years, (3)
conducted nearly all of its business in Florida, (4) "had a registered agent in
[Florida] until shortly before this suit was filed" against it, and (5) had liti-
gated in Florida courts.41 2 The Fifth District concluded that the approach
taken by the Fourth District was too focused on a temporal event-
engagement in substantial business activities at the time suit was filed.
4 13
The Fifth District also acknowledged that how long a nonresident defendant
must be continuously and systematically conducting activities in Florida
prior to suit being filed in order to pass long-arm muster "is not subject to
specific delineation.' ' 4  In analyzing the provision of the "general jurisdic-
tion" statutory prong at issue in Singer that says "is engaged," the district
court concluded that "at a minimum, 'is engaged' must be interpreted to also
involve past activities. We conclude that a better interpretation focuses on
the activities of the nonresident during a reasonable period of time prior to
filing the complaint, but not necessarily up until [the time] the complaint is
filed. ' ' 5 The Fifth District held that:
When the activities of the nonresident are of sufficient quality that
it should in fairness expect to defend itself here, it should not make
a difference that it happens to cease these activities prior to the fll-
408. Id. at 787-88.
409. Id. at 788.
410. 987 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008). The court in Singer noted that "[al-
though it did not say so expressly, the Buckingham panel apparently adopted the same reason-
ing as used in Arch Aluminum & Glass Co. v. Haney, 964 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2007)." Singer, 43 So. 3d at 788.
411. Id. (quoting Arch Aluminum & Glass Co., 964 So. 2d at 237).
412. Id. at 789.
413. Id. at 788.
414. Id.
415. Singer, 43 So. 3d at 789.
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ing of the complaint, especially where the activities occur close in
time to the events giving rise to the cause of action.4 16
The Fifth District found that both statutory and constitutional authority ex-
isted to permit the exercise of jurisdiction over the partnership and general
partners.4" 7 Conflict was not certified with the Fourth District.
418
B. Forum and Jurisdiction Selection Clause: Mandatory Versus Permis-
sive
Celistics, LLC (Employer), which has its headquarters in Miami-Dade
County, allegedly hired Mr. Gonzalez (Employee) to work in the United
States pursuant to a written agreement providing that "'[i]n the event of any
doubt, question or conflict which may arise from the interpretation or im-
plementation of this agreement, the parties agree to select the venue and ju-
risdiction of the Courts and Tribunals of the city of Madrid.'" 419 Employee
alleged that he relocated himself and his family from Argentina to Miami in
reliance on oral and subsequent written assurances that his employment
would not be for less than one year, but that his employment was ended by
Employer after Employee had completed only five months of employment.
420
Employee sued Employer in the Miami-Dade Circuit Court.42 ' Employer
moved for dismissal based on the forum selection clause, but the trial court
denied Employer's motion "finding that the forum selection clause [was]
permissive," not mandatory.4 22 Employer appealed, and the Third District
Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.423 The district court, relying on
principles set out in Golf Scoring Systems Unlimited, Inc. v. Remedio42 4 and
Sauder v. Rayman,425 determined that the forum selection case was mandato-
ry, despite the absence of any "'magic words' of exclusivity, such as 'shall'
416. Id.
417. Id. The general partners of the Michigan limited partnership were Michigan corpora-
tions. Id. at 786.
418. See id. at 788-89.
419. Celistics, L.L.C. v. Gonzalez, 22 So. 3d 824, 825 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
420. Id.
421. Id. Employee, in his four-count complaint, sought unpaid wages under section
448.08 of the Florida Statutes, alleged breach of two written agreements-one for employ-
ment and the other dealing with severance-and sought restitution based on equitable estop-
pel. Id.
422. Id.
423. Celistics, L.LC., 22 So. 3d at 824-25.
424. 877 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (per curiam).
425. 800 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
[Vol. 35
42
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss1/2
2010] SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAWAFFECTING BUSINESS OWNERS 43
or 'must"' or "'to the exclusion of all others."'426 The "plain and unambi-
guous language" of the forum selection provision, including the words
"'agree' and "'select,"' made the clause mandatory.427
The Supreme Court of Florida, the Fifth District Court of Appeal, and
the First District Court of Appeal have held that an "unambiguous and man-
datory" forum selection clause may, nevertheless, be set aside if it is shown
that it would not be reasonable, fair or just to enforce the provision.428 In-
deed, the Third District Court of Appeal so held in Copacabana Records,
Inc. v. Wea Latina, Inc. 29 Presumably, the issue was not before the Third
District in Celistics, LLC v. Gonzalez.430
XV. LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP
A. Formalities of Lease Execution: Limited Liability Company
NMB Plaza, LLC (Landlord LLC) entered into a written business lease
with Skylake Insurance Agency, Inc. (Tenant).431 The lease was for ten
years, but had a delayed starting date of ninety days after completion of con-
426. Celistics, L.LC., 22 So. 3d at 826 (quoting Golf Scoring Sys. Unlimited, Inc., 877 So.
2d at 829).
427. Id.
428. Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437,440 n.4 (Fla. 1986) (citing The Bremen v. Zapa-
ta Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)); Travel Express Inv. Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 14 So. 3d
1224, 1227 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009), discussed at Landau, 2008-2009 Survey, supra note
375, at 102; Aqua Sun Mgmt., Inc. v. Divi Time Ltd., 797 So. 2d 24, 24-25 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (per curiam); Mgmt. Computer Controls, Inc. v. Charles Perry Constr., Inc., 743
So. 2d 627, 631 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
429. 791 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (per curiam) (citing Manrique,
493 So. 2d at 440).
430. 22 So. 3d 824, 825 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009). As the Supreme Court of Florida
held in Manrique, while "forum selection clauses should be enforced in the absence of a
showing that enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust," Manrique, 493 So. 2d at 440,
"the test of unreasonableness is not mere inconvenience or additional expense." Id. at 440 n.4
(citation omitted). The Supreme Court of Florida quoted the Supreme Court of the United
States in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972), where the Supreme
Court of the United States said that:
[Ilt should be incumbent on the party seeking to escape his contract to show that trial in the
contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all practical
purposes be deprived of his day in court. Absent that, there is no basis for concluding that it
would be unfair, unjust, or unreasonable to hold that party to his bargain.
Manrique, 493 So. 2d at 440 n.4 (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18).
431. Skylake Ins. Agency, Inc. v. NMB Plaza, L.L.C., 23 So. 3d 175, 176 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 2009). The lease was signed by a member of Landlord LLC and by the president and
vice president of Tenant. Id.
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struction of the building, which was under construction.432 None of the sig-
natures were witnessed, and shortly before construction was finished, the
lease was repudiated by Landlord LLC based on the lack of subscribing wit-
nesses.133 Tenant sued for specific performance or alternatively for damages,
alleging fraud.4" On motion for summary judgment, the trial court ruled in
favor of Landlord LLC.4 35 Tenant appealed, and relying on section 608.4235
of the Florida Statutes, argued that two witnesses were not required since
Landlord LLC was a limited liability company.436 Section 608.4235(3) spe-
cifies who may "sign and deliver" documents transferring or affecting the
interest of a limited liability company in real estate.437 Unless otherwise pro-
vided in the articles of organization or a limited liability company's operat-
ing agreement, if the company is member-managed, then any member may
sign, and if it is a manager-managed company, then the manager may sign.438
Chapter 608 does not mandate that the signatures be witnessed.439 On the
other hand, section 689.01 does require witnesses for real estate conveyances
and leases for a term of more than a year, except for certain corporate con-
veyances."4 The district court concluded that the exception for corporations
was inapplicable." Thus, on motion for rehearing, the Third District Court
of Appeal held that the two subscribing witness requirement of section
689.01 was not satisfied.442 In other words, while Chapter 608 of the Florida
Statutes-which specifies how a limited liability company's real estate inter-
ests may be conveyed--does not require that the member or manager sign in
the presence of two subscribing witnesses, section 689.01 does." 3 Tenant
also argued Landlord LLC should be estopped from raising the section
689.01 requirement because Landlord LLC not only drafted the lease, but
also drafted it without signature lines.' Furthermore, Landlord LLC failed
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Skylake Ins. Agency, Inc., 23 So. 3d at 176.
436. Id. at 177.
437. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 608.4235(3) (2003)). The lease was signed by a member of
Landlord LLC. Id. Landlord admitted that the lease was signed, and no claim was made on
behalf of Landlord LLC that the signature was unauthorized. Id.
438. Skylake Ins. Agency, Inc., 23 So. 3d at 177 (citing FLA. STAT. § 608.4235(3) (2003)).
439. Id.
440. Id. at 178; FLA. STAT. § 689.01 (2003).
441. See Skylake Ins. Agency, Inc., 23 So. 3d at 177.
442. See id. at 178. In light of the Third District Court of Appeal's decision on rehearing,
the discussion in this Survey of this decision supersedes the discussion reported in Landau,
2008-2009 Survey, supra note 375.
443. Skylake Ins. Agency, Inc., 23 So. 3d at 177-78.
444. Id at 178.
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to have the signing member's signature witnessed. 45 The Third District held
that in order to support an estoppel claim, "tenant must have changed [his or
her] position in more than an insubstantial way." The district court
noted,"In the decided estoppel cases involving leases, the tenant took posses-
sion and the landlord accepted the rent."447 The Third District found no such
facts of the requisite changed position and upheld the trial court's summary
judgment that denied Tenant's request for specific performance. 448 However,
the Third District, relying on the Supreme Court of Florida's holding in Reed
v. Moore,449 concluded that the lease agreement did serve as a contract under
section 725.01 of Florida's Statute of Frauds, even though it failed as the
conveyance of real estate under section 689.01.450 The Third District, citing
its decision in Cabrerizo v. Fortune International Realty,451 stated that "lan-
dlord will not be allowed to profit from its own wrong" in that Landlord
could at anytime have corrected the lack of witnesses problem rather than
relying on the problem "to disavow the contract., 452 The decision of the trial
court granting summary judgment to Landlord LLC on Tenant's breach of
contract and fraud claims was reversed.453
B. Purchase Option in Lease
A lease agreement gave Tenant the option to purchase the leased real
estate "provided that the [Tenant] is not in default of any part of this Lease
Agreement., 454 Tenant had paid the rent late several times, but in each case
the default was cured.455 Tenant attempted to exercise the option but was
met with Landlord's objection that since Tenant had been in default under
the lease, Tenant lost the right to exercise the option.456 The Third District
Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in concluding that language of
the option provision meant that any default by Tenant under the lease termi-
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Skylake Ins. Agency, Inc., 23 So. 3d at 178.
449. 109 So. 86 (Fla. 1926).
450. Skylake Ins. Agency, Inc., 23 So. 3d at 179 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 725.01, 689.01
(2003)).
451. 760 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
452. Skylake Ins. Agency, Inc., 23 So. 3d at 179 (citing Cabrerizo, 760 So. 2d at 229).
453. Id.
454. Welde v. Top Video & Prods. USA, Inc., 35 So. 3d 119, 120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2010).
455. Id.
456. Id.
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nated the option, and the trial court agreed with Landlord.457 What the option
provision meant was that Tenant could not be in default at the time Tenant
exercised the option.45' The Third District Court of Appeal reversed and
remanded for a determination by the trial court as to whether or not Tenant
was in default under any of the lease provisions at the time the option exer-
cise was attempted.459 If Tenant was not in default at even one of the times
the option was exercised, then Tenant "was entitled to exercise the option. '
XVI. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
In this "reverse piercing" case, 17315 Collins Avenue, LLC (Subsidiary
LLC) was the wholly owned subsidiary of Wavestone Properties, LLC (Par-
ent LLC).461 Parent LLC made an agreement with Fortune Development
Sales Corporation (Sales) whereby Sales would have the exclusive right to
market and sell condominium units owned by Parent LLC.4 2 Parent LLC
was found by the trial court to have breached the agreement, and Sales ob-
tained a judgment against Parent LLC for more than $1,500,000.463 The trial
court allowed Sales to record its judgment against Subsidiary LLC's real
estate, thus piercing the corporate veil of Parent LLC.464 The Third District
Court of Appeal affirmed. 5 Citing the Supreme Court of Florida in Dania
Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes,466 the appellate court stated: "'To pierce the
corporate veil under Florida law, it must be shown not only that the wholly-
owned subsidiary is a mere instrumentality of the parent corporation but also
that the subsidiary was organized or used by the parent to mislead creditors
or to perpetrate a fraud upon them."'' 7 It was determined that Parent LLC
and Subsidiary LLC were alter egos, and "there was little distinction be-
tween" them.468 The court found an improper use of Subsidiary LLC by Par-
ent LLC when Parent LLC deposited with Subsidiary LLC $250,000 of real
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Welde, 35 So. 3d at 120-21.
460. Id. at 120.
461. 17315 Collins Ave., L.L.C. v. Fortune Dev. Sales Corp., 34 So. 3d 166, 167 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 167-68.
465. Id. at 170.
466. 450 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1984).
467. Fortune Dev. Sales Corp., 34 So. 3d at 168 (quoting Ocala Breeders' Sales Co. v.
Hialeah, Inc., 735 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam)).
468. Id.
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estate sales commissions initially set aside to pay part of Sales' judgment,
but later improperly used for Subsidiary LLC's operating expenses.469
XVII. TAXES
The state of Maine obtained a tax judgment against Taxpayer for over
$64,000.470 Maine recorded the judgment in Citrus County pursuant to sec-
tion 55.503 of the Florida Statutes47 land notified Taxpayer that it had done
SO.472 Taxpayer successfully moved to have the judgment vacated.473 The
Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.474 Taxpayer per-
suaded the trial court that section 72.041 of the Florida Statutes, entitled
"'Tax liabilities arising under the laws of other states,"' which reads in part
"that '[a]ctions to enforce lawfully imposed sales, use, and corporate income
taxes and motor and other fuel taxes of another state may be brought in a
court of this state,"' meant that it was the policy of Florida not to enforce
foreign taxes not mentioned in that section, that is, foreign individual income
taxes.475 The appellate court concluded that the trial court had misinterpreted
section 72.041, and that section 55.503 applied, as did the requirement to
give the judgment full faith and credit under the United States Constitu-
tion.476
XVII. TORTS
A. Claims Arising from Alleged Misrepresentations by Mortgage Lender
Borrowers contracted with Builder to build them a home on North Cap-
tiva Island.477 Builder's agent suggested Bank as a resource for obtaining
construction financing and Bank provided Borrowers with construction fi-
nancing, with the home to serve as collateral.478 About ten months later,
469. Id. at 169.
470. State v. Hanson, 36 So. 3d 879, 879 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam).
471. Section 55.503(1) of the Florida Statutes provides for recording of a certified copy of
a foreign judgment with the circuit court clerk of Florida and gives such judgment the "same
effect" as a Florida circuit court or county court judgment, and subjects the foreign judgment
to the same rules as such Florida judgments. FLA. STAT. § 55.503(1) (2008).
472. Hanson, 36 So. 3d at 879.
473. Id. at 880.
474. Id.
475. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 72.041 (2008)).
476. Id.
477. Ladner v. AmSouth Bank, 32 So. 3d 99, 101 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
478. Id.
47
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Bank sued Borrowers in foreclosure, "alleging that the project had been
abandoned and that the loan funds improperly had been diverted from" the
project.479 The foreclosure action was settled, but Borrowers had filed sever-
al counterclaims that were not settled.480 Among the counterclaims were two
counts alleging misrepresentations by Bank regarding the soundness of
Builder that induced Borrowers into making the construction contract with
Builder.48' One claim alleged negligent misrepresentation and the other al-
leged fraudulent misrepresentation.482 An additional count alleged that Bank
"breached the loan agreement by making improper [loan] disbursements. 483
The trial court dismissed all counts of the counterclaim. 484 The Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.485 The trial court correctly
dismissed the counts alleging breach of the loan agreement, as well as the
misrepresentation counterclaims based on the contract, because of the hold
harmless and related provisions in the loan agreement and another docu-
ment.486 However, because of Borrower's allegation of detrimental reliance
on the alleged negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations with respect to
Borrower's entering into its contract with Builder, the trial court needed to
further address these claims.487 The appellate court noted that the trial court
also found that all of the counterclaims were barred based upon the economic
loss rule.488 While that might bar all of the counterclaims that arose from the
loan agreement,489 "'[w]hen ... fraud occurs in ... connection with misre-
presentations, statements, or omissions which cause the complaining party to
enter into a transaction, then such fraud is fraud in the inducement and sur-
vives as an independent tort.' ' 4 90 The cause of action is not barred by the
economic loss rule.491 Thus, Borrower's counterclaim against Bank was
reinstated.492
479. Id.
480. See id.
481. Id.
482. Ladner, 32 So. 3d at 101.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 105.
486. Id. at 102.
487. Ladner, 32 So. 3d at 102.
488. Id. at 105.
489. Id. The district court did not have to "address whether the economic loss rule would
bar [Borrower's] tort claims" because the contract provisions barred the claims that arose from
the contract. Id.
490. Id. (quoting Output, Inc. v. Danka Bus. Sys., Inc., 991 So. 2d 941, 944 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2008)).
491. Ladner, 32 So. 3d at 105.
492. Id.
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B. Product Liability and Negligence
Decedent "was run over and killed by a huge mobile crane at the Port of
Miami., 493 Liebherr-America, Inc. (Seller) sold the crane to one of the other
defendants and "agree[d] to keep it in good repair. '49 4 Seller did not design
or manufacture the crane, was not operating the crane when the accident oc-
curred, and did not own or have control of the property where Decedent was
killed.495 Nevertheless, the jury found Seller partially liable for the death of
Decedent. 6  Seller appealed, and the Third District Court of Appeal re-
versed, directing that judgment be entered in favor of Seller. 7 Since the
"jury found that the crane was not defective at the time of the sale," there
could not be liability on the part of Seller, as "a seller and servicer."498 This
is because "[t]he primary duty and responsibility of a seller and servicer of
equipment like [Seller] is ordinarily found in the claim that, at the time of the
sale, the equipment contained a defect which rendered it unreasonably dan-
gerous to persons in the vicinity of the crane., 499 As to the claim that Seller
failed to properly perform its service obligations with respect to the crane,
the evidence did not support such a claim. 5° There were allegations that a
horn was not working correctly, but no evidence that the horn had failed was
presented, or if it had failed, that Seller had prior notice of it.5' In addition,
there was no evidence of negligence in not repairing it.5 °2 Moreover, there
was no evidence that the horn "was even a legal cause of the accident."50 3
"[T]here is simply no duty on the part of a seller-or anyone in the distribu-
tive chain-to warn of dangers presented by [the product's] operation after it
has passed from [the seller's] control.' 5°
493. Liebherr-America, Inc. v. McCollum, 43 So. 3d 65, 66 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. Liebherr-America, Inc., 43 So. 3d at 67.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 67-68.
501. Id. at 68.
502. Id.
503. Liebherr-America, Inc., 43 So. 3d at 68.
504. Id.
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C. Professional Liability
In Witt v. La Gorce Country Club, Inc.,505 the Third District Court of
Appeal issued a replacement opinion for its earlier decision that was dis-
cussed in a prior survey. 5°6 The district court still held that a professional
liability limitation in a contract does not apply to professionals involved in
the work covered by the contract.
507
XIX. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND DEBTORICREDITOR RIGHTS
A. Jurisdiction Over Judgment Debtor
On December 6, 1988, Whitson & Whitson, P.A. (Creditor) obtained a
judgment against Mr. Petersen (Judgment Debtor) in the Pinellas County
Circuit Court.50 8 The judgment was in excess of $400,000.' 09 When the ac-
tion was started and when judgment was obtained, Judgment Debtor was a
Florida resident. 1° Creditor assigned the judgment to Mr. Whitson (Judg-
ment Creditor).51' Judgment Debtor became a Georgia resident in 2007. 512
About ten months later, on April 25, 2008, which date was less than twenty
years after the entry of the judgment in the original action, Judgment Credi-
tor filed suit in Pinellas County Circuit Court seeking renewal of the original
judgment." 3 Process was served on Judgment Debtor in Georgia, and he
responded by filing a motion to dismiss. 5 4 Judgment Debtor asserted that he
had moved to Georgia, and that "he had not 'done any act which would sub-
mit himself to the jurisdiction"' under the long-arm statute, section 48.193 of
the Florida Statutes, or otherwise.515 The trial court denied his motion to
dismiss, and the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed.516 The Second
District noted that the writ of scire facias had earlier been used to revive a
judgment. 517 A petition for writ of scirefacias was considered to be "a con-
505. 35 So. 3d 1033 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
506. Id. at 1035; see Landau, 2008-2009 Survey, supra note 375, at 138.
507. Witt, 35 So. 3d at 1039.
508. Petersen v. Whitson, 14 So. 3d 300, 301 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Petersen, 14 So. 3d at 301. The statute of limitations on a judgment entered by a
court of record is twenty years. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(1) (2010).
514. Petersen, 14 So. 3d at 302.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 302-03.
517. Id. at 302.
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tinuation of the original action," not a new action.518 The modem procedure
is "by motion after notice" pursuant to Rule 1.100(d) of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure.519 Like the earlier procedure, the modern procedure for
reviving a judgment-and thereby resetting the statute of limitations-
should be viewed as "a continuation of the original action" and as such, per-
sonal jurisdiction over a judgment debtor continues as to the "court that ren-
dered the judgment in the original action."52°
B. Creditors' Claims: Inherited IRA
Lender sued Borrower "on a promissory note and obtained a judgment
against him [for over] $188,000. '' 2' Borrower had been named as the bene-
ficiary of his late father's Individual Retirement Account (IRA).122 The ac-
count was administered by RBC Capital Markets Corporation (IRA Adminis-
trator).523 IRA Administrator explained to Borrower his options concerning
the IRA, and Borrower decided to transfer his father's IRA to an "inherited
IRA."524 When Lender sought to enforce his judgment against Borrower's
inherited IRA account, Borrower relied on section 222.21(2)(a) of the Flori-
da Statutes to prevent levy on the account. 25 That section provides in part
that "'any money or other assets payable to an owner, a participant, or a be-
neficiary from, or any interest of any owner, participant, or beneficiary in, a
fund or account,"' referring to a fund or account exempt from federal income
taxation under any of sections 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 414,
457(b) and 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, "'is exempt from all claims
of creditors of the owner, beneficiary, or participant.' ' '526 The trial court
ruled that an inherited IRA was no longer an IRA under that definition, and
Borrower's inherited IRA account was denied protection from levy. 527 The
Second District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the Florida statutory
protection from creditors accorded to an IRA was intended only for the orig-
inal account or fund of the IRA owner. 28 The Second District also cited
518. Id.
519. Petersen, 14 So. 3d at 302 n.3; FLA. R. Ctv. P. 1.100(d).
520. Petersen, 14 So. 3d at 302-03.
521. Robertson v. Deeb, 16 So. 3d 936, 937 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Id.
525. Id. at 937-38.
526. Robertson, 16 So. 3d at 938 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 222.21(2)(a) (2008)).
527. Id. at 938.
528. Id. at 938-39.
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several bankruptcy cases to the same effect with respect to state law creditor
exemptions.529
C. Construction Lien: Strict Compliance
A construction lien was recorded in favor of Designerick, Inc. (Lienor)
against the Unnerstalls' real estate to secure payment of more than $21,000
that Lienor claimed was due for installation of cabinets.53° The Unnerstalls
started proceedings for cancellation of the lien pursuant to section 713.21 of
the Florida Statutes.53' It was then up to Lienor to "strictly comply with the
statute to [protect] its lien. 5 32 Lienor's response to the Unnerstalls' Com-
plaint and the Order to Show Cause was an answer that contained affirmative
defenses and counterclaims, but no request for foreclosure of its lien.533
Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that the counterclaims were sufficient
to prevent discharge of the lien.534 The Second District Court of Appeal re-
versed, ruling that Lienor failed to strictly comply with the lien statute by not
acting to enforce the lien within twenty days.535 The district court noted that
Lienor could, despite discharge of the lien, still pursue its counterclaims. 5 36
The Fifth District Court of Appeal in KA Properties, LLC v. USA Con-
struction, Inc. 537 also recently held that strict compliance with the statutory
529. Id. at 939; see In re Kirchen, 344 B.R. 908, 914 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Tay-
lor, No. 05-93559, 2006 WL 1275400, at *2 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. May 9, 2006); In re Greenfield,
289 B.R. 146, 150 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2003); In re Sims, 241 B.R. 467, 470 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
1999).
530. Unnerstall v. Designerick, Inc., 17 So. 3d 900, 901 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
531. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 713.21(4) (2008)).
532. Id. at 902 (citing Ruffolo v. Parish & Bowman, Inc., 966 So. 2d 434, 436 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2007)).
533. Id. at 901. Lienor's counterclaim alleged "breach of [an] oral contract, open account,
and unjust enrichment," and sought money damages. Id. at 901-02.
534. Unnerstall, 17 So. 3d at 901-02.
535. Id. at 902. The Second District Court of Appeal cited two decisions, Brookshire v.
GP Constr. of Palm Beach, Inc., 993 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008), and Dracon
Constr.., Inc. v. Facility Constr. Mgmt, Inc., 828 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002), in
support of its ruling that the counterclaims did not constitute strict compliance. Id. In Brook-
shire, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Lienor's filing of a motion to compel
arbitration did not meet the statutory requirements of section 713.21 of the Florida Statutes to
preserve the lien. Brookshire, 993 So. 2d at 180; see also Landau, 2008-2009 Survey, supra
note 375, at 78 (discussing the potential issues that may arise where the parties involved in a
statutory lien action are also parties to an agreement calling for binding arbitration).
536. Unnerstall, 17 So. 3d at 902 n.2.
537. 35 So. 3d 1015 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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procedure is required to preserve the lien.538 Lienor's answer to the com-
plaint that the "lien was valid and not exaggerated" did not constitute strict
compliance.539
D. Usury
A member of a law firm received money from two foreign individual
"investors" under agreements that promised what would have amounted to
annual returns of 600% in one case and 580% in another.' The agreements
were purportedly made between each of the individuals and the law firm,
with the law firm member signing as "trustee for" and initially, "on behalf
of' an undisclosed client."I "Invested" funds were deposited "to the law
firm's trust account.""M2 There were extension agreements signed and the
repayment amounts were increased, but the extension agreements did not
refer to the law firm.5 43 When repayment was not made pursuant to the
agreements as a result of the law firm members' "fraudulent scheme," the
two foreign individuals sued the law firm and the firm's clients, whose iden-
tities had been disclosed in the extension agreements.544 The trial court, on
the law firm and client's motions for summary judgment, held that the
agreements amounted to usurious short-term loans and refused to enforce
them.5 45 The trial court also held that the firm member did not have authority
to bind the firm to the agreements, the agreements were "clearly illegal," and
the making of the agreements was not within the scope of the member's em-
ployment.546 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed.547 Under section
687.071 of the Florida Statutes, annual simple interest called for on loans of
this type exceeding 25% constitutes criminal usury rendering unenforceable
the payment of principal and interest. 48 The Third District also rejected the
538. Id. at 1016. The Fifth District Court of Appeal noted that Lienor did file a counter-
claim after it filed its answer, but the counterclaim was too late, having been filed twenty-nine
days after service of the summons. Id. The opinion does not disclose what the counterclaim
alleged or if the counterclaim would have satisfied the strict compliance requirement had it
been timely filed.
539. Id.
540. Saralegui v. Sacher, Zelman, Van Sant Paul, Beily, Hartman & Waldman, P.A., 19
So. 3d 1048, 1050-51 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
541. Id. at 1050.
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. Id. at 1050, 1052.
545. Saralegui, 19 So. 3d at 1050-51 n.1.
546. Id. at 1050-51.
547. Id. at 1053.
548. Id. at 1051 n.l (citing FLA. STAT. § 687.071(2) (2003)).
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claim that the firm member acted as an apparent agent of the law firm.549
There was no requisite representation of agency by the law firm in the par-
ticular transactions.55° And as to both the usury issue and the apparent au-
thority issue, the Third District said there were no genuine issues of material
fact. " ' The district court acknowledged that although foreigners may be
accustomed to lawyers in their countries acting in various non-legal business
roles, "our system draws clear distinctions among these roles and clear
boundaries between the legal representation of a lender and a borrower., 552
Surely, "[h]ad the ['investors'] retained a Florida lawyer [for] independent
advice before making these loans . . . [the transaction] would have caused
legal eyebrows to rise and the investors to flee.,
553
E. National Bank: Right to Sue in Florida
770 PPR, LLC and 140 Associates, Ltd. (Mortgagors) obtained mort-
gage financing from Seacoast National Bank (National Bank) secured by
their Florida real estate. 4 The mortgages went into default, and National
Bank foreclosed on the mortgaged properties.555 Mortgagors defended by
claiming that National Bank had failed to obtain a "certificate of authority"
as called for by section 607.1501(1) of the Florida Statutes.556 Mortgagors
argued that National Bank was a foreign corporation and thus the statute
required it to get permission to do business, in Florida, by obtaining a certifi-
cate of authority from the Florida Department of State.557 They argued that
the penalty for failure to do so was to deny National Bank the right to sue in
this state.558 The trial court rejected Mortgagors' argument, and the foreclo-
549. See id. at 1052.
550. See Saralegui, 19 So. 3d at 1052.
551. Id. at 1051. Regardless of what these transactions were called, they were loans, and
the usury statute applied. Id. n. 1. Further, "corrupt intent" does not require that the lenders
know of the usury statutes or have "a specific intention to violate them." Id. at 1051. What is
required is proof of intent to collect payments on the loan that, when expressed as an annual
simple rate of return, exceed the statutory amount. Saralegui, 19 So. 3d at 1051. "[I]gnorance
of the usury statutes is not a defense." Id. at 1051 n.2 (citing Mickler v. Marantha Realty
Assoc., Inc., 50 BR. 818, 828 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); Ross v. Whitman, 181 So. 2d 701,
703 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966)).
552. Saralegui, 19 So. 3d at 1053.
553. Id.
554. 770 PPR, L.L.C. v. TJCV Land Trust, 30 So. 3d 613, 615 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2010).
555. Id.
556. Id. at 616; FLA. STAT. § 607.1501(1) (2010).
557. 770PPR, LL.C.,30So. 3dat616.
558. Id.
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sures were permitted. 559 The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, stat-
ing that "this case presents a novel issue in Florida.' 560 The appellate court
quoted from section 24 of the National Bank Act with respect to the powers
of a national banking association: "'Fourth. To sue and be sued, complain
and defend, in any court of law and equity, as fully as natural persons.
'561
The National Bank Act preempted Florida's requirement that foreign corpo-
rations obtain permission to do business in Florida before being allowed to
sue. 562 The appellate court looked to decisions in other states to support its
563
conclusion.
F. "No Lien" Notice
In June, 2005, the then Owner (Landlord) of a Broward County shop-
ping center, pursuant to section 713.10 of the Florida Statutes, recorded a
notice to the effect that all leases Landlord had entered into with tenants con-
tained language identical to that quoted in the notice stating Landlord's inter-
est in the property was not "'subject to liens for improvements made by
[t]enant[s]. ' '' 564 Landlord entered into a lease with a Tenant (Tenant) in 2006
that contained different "no lien" language than the recorded notice lan-
guage. 565 In March 2007, Landlord sold the shopping center to Landlord's
Assignee, to whom all of the leases were assigned. 566 During this time, a
sub-contractor (Subcontractor) had done construction work for Tenant.
567
When Subcontractor failed to receive payment for some of its work, it filed a
claim of lien against the property leased to Tenant, now owned by Lan-
dlord's Assignee.568 Assignee was successful in having the lien discharged,
relying on section 713.10.69 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed
because section 713.10 notice was defective.570 The language of Tenant's
lease was "significantly different, and more conditional" than that contained
559. See id. at 615.
560. Id. at 617, 619.
561. Id. at 617 (quoting 12 U.S.C § 24 (2006)).
562. 770PPR, L.L.C.,30So. 3dat618.
563. Id. at 617-18 (citing e.g., Ind. Nat'l Bank v. Roberts, 326 So. 2d 802, 802-803 (Miss.
1976)).
564. Everglades Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Paraiso Granite, L.L.C., 28 So. 3d 235, 236 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (citing FLA. STAT. § 713.10 (2010)).
565. See id. at 236-37.
566. Id. at 236.
567. Id.
568. Id.
569. Everglades Elec. Supply, Inc., 28 So. 3d at 237; see generally FLA. STAT. § 713.10
(2010).
570. Everglades Elec. Supply, Inc., 28 So. 3d at 238.
55
Landau: 2009-2010 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners
Published by NSUWorks, 2010
NOVA LAW REVIEW
in the recorded section 713.10 notice.571 The district court noted that under
section 713.10, Landlord could have shielded itself either by (1) recording
Tenant's lease or a short form of the lease that contained the lien protection
language or (2) by filing a notice containing "[tihe specific language con-
tained in the various leases prohibiting such liability" for work done on the
premises at the tenant's behest. 572 In this case, Landlord did not do any of
the two.
573
G. Secured Party's Right to Consigned Property
A painting was consigned by its owner (Consignor) to an art gallery for
sale.5 74 At the time of the consignment, the gallery's inventory was subject
to a perfected security interest in all of the gallery's inventory, securing
$300,000 in loans made by Lender to the gallery.575 Consignor, unlike
Lender, did not file a UCC- 1 financing statement regarding his ownership of
the painting.576 The painting was not tagged or similarly identified as being
on consignment, and no notice was posted by the art gallery.577 After the
gallery defaulted on the loan, Lender foreclosed its security interest, the trial
court entered a judgment in favor of Lender, and a writ of replevin was is-
sued for the gallery's inventory.578 Consignor was allowed to intervene in
the action, and the trial court declared his interest in the painting superior to
Lender's interest.579 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. 580 Con-
signor could have protected himself by (1) filing UCC- 1 financial statements
with respect to his interest in the painting "or (2) prov[ing] that the [art gal-
lery] was generally known by its creditors to be substantially engaged in
571. Id.
572. Id. at 237-38 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.10(2)(c)).
573. See id. at 238.
574. Rayfield Inv. Co. v. Kreps, 35 So. 3d 63, 64 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. Id. Section 686.502(2) of the Florida Statutes:
requires the cosignor of works of art to give notice to the public by: "affixing to such work of
art a sign or tag which states that such work of art is being sold subject to a contract of con-
signment, or such consignee shall post a clear and conspicuous sign in consignee's place of
business giving notice that some works of art are being sold subject to a contract of consign-
ment."
Id. n.2 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 686.502(2)). What would the result have been if there had been
a tag or notice posted? Would that have been enough to give owner priority of prior perfected
security interests?
578. RayfieldInv. Co., 35 So. 3d at 64.
579. Id.
580. Id. at 64, 67.
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selling the goods of others., 581  He did neither.582  The district court ob-
served, "Some legal rules explicitly allow their application to be varied by
individual circumstances, using equitable principles, but the commercial law
on secured transactions is not among them." '583
H. Tolling of Statute of Limitations
Section 95.051(1) of the Florida Statutes provides in part: "(1) The
running of the time under any statute of limitations except [sections] 95.281,
95.35 and 95.36 is tolled by... (f) [t]he payment of any part of the principal
or interest of any obligation or liability founded on a written instrument.
' '584
Mortgagors brought an action against Mortgagee alleging violation of the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) .585 The prob-
lem faced by Mortgagors was that suit was filed eight years after the alleged
violation and was thus apparently barred by the applicable statute of limita-
tions.586 Mortgagors attempted to avoid the limitations period by proving
their regular monthly mortgage payments, which they claimed brought them
581. Id. at 66. The district court stated that "[t]he consignor in this case could have de-
feated the priority of secured creditors only by proving that a majority of the gallery's credi-
tors knew that it was substantially engaged in consignment sales." Id. (emphasis added). Was
the district court saying that under the facts of this case where there was no UCC-I filed, no
tag or notice posted by consignee, the only remaining basis for defeating the Lender's prior
perfected security interest would have been satisfying the "generally known" test? It is sub-
mitted that just how much is required of a consignor in order to defeat a prior perfected securi-
ty interest is open to debate. The district court in Rayfield Investment Co., relying on In re
Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002), a case the court considered "factually
similar" to the case before it, said that the court in In re Valley Media, Inc. "observed that the
consignors could have obtained a prior interest in their consigned goods if they had either (1)
filed UCC-1 financing statements ... or (2) proved that the consignee was generally known
by its creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others." Rayfield Inv. Co.,
35 So. 3d at 66 (citing In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. at 123). The district court concluded
that:
[t]he law creating the priority rule afforded consignor effective tools to avoid a prior security
interest in gallery's inventory. These tools were simple, not burdensome, and easily satisfied.
He needed only to file a UCC-l under Florida law. Aside from that, he could have required
the gallery to affix a tag onto the painting and place a sign alerting prospective buyers of a
consignment sale. He did none of these things.
Id. at67.
582. Id.
583. Id.
584. FLA. STAT. § 95.05 1(1), (1)(f) (2010).
585. Brown v. Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 32 So. 3d 661,662 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2010).
586. Id.
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under the tolling provisions of section 95.05 l(1)(f). 587 The trial court held
that the statute of limitations applied and dismissed Mortgagors' complaint
with prejudice. 588 The First District Court of Appeal affirmed. 58 9 The appel-
late court held that section 95.051(l)(f) only applied to creditors.5'9 "'With-
out the protection of the statute, a compassionate obligee that accepts sporad-
ic part-payments from the obligor could risk jeopardizing its collection
rights."'5 9' The appellate court acknowledged that the statute had to "be giv-
en its plain meaning to the extent its language is clear and unambiguous,"
unless doing that "would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result., 592 Judge
Thomas dissented, stating that the plain wording of the section did not limit
its effect to creditors.593
I. Disposition of Collateral
Borrower borrowed $840,000 from Bank and signed promissory notes
that were guaranteed by several individuals (Guarantors) and secured by all
of Borrower's then owned or later acquired "inventory, furniture, supplies,
equipment, fixtures," and certain intangibles.594 Borrower defaulted, and
Bank, having been granted a "pre-judgment writ of replevin," took posses-
sion of the tangible property pledged as security and hired a company to do
an inventory of the assets.595 There were three auctions, and the auction
proceeds from the sale of the collateral were approximately $317,000, which
was less than half of the amount owed on the notes.596 Borrower and Gua-
rantors alleged that several items of collateral taken by Bank were not auc-
tioned, and no explanation was given for the omissions.597 On motion for
summary judgment, the trial court granted Bank a deficiency judgment, but
the Third District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that there was "a
587. Id.
588. Id.
589. Id. at 664.
590. See Brown, 32 So. 3d at 664.
591. Id. (quoting S. Motor Co. of Dade Cnty. v. Doktorczyk, 957 So. 2d 1215, 1218 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007)).
592. Id. at 662-63 (citing Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 297 (Fla. 2000), super-
seded by statute, Act effective July 1, 1999, ch. 99-8, 1999 Fla. Laws 351, as recognized in
Sheffield v. Superior Ins. Co., 800 So. 2d 197, 200 n.3 (Fla. 2001)); Maddox v. State, 923 So.
2d 442, 446 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam).
593. Brown, 32 So. 3d at 664 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
594. Tropical Jewelers, Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A. (Tropical 11), 19 So. 3d 424, 425 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
595. Id.
596. Id. at 425-26.
597. Id. at 426.
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genuine issue of material fact as to whether the collateral was disposed of in
a commercially reasonable fashion."5 ' On remand, the trial judge consi-
dered the missing and unsold items of collateral, the advertising efforts made
by the auctioneer, and the degree of the auctioneer's experience in disposing
of similar items of collateral, and concluded that the collateral was not dis-
posed of in a commercially reasonable fashion.5" The Third District, in
Tropical Jewelers, Inc. v. Bank of America, N.A. (Tropical I1),600 affirmed the
trial court's decision denying Bank a deficiency judgment.60
J. Documentary Tax Stamps: Promissory Note
Although prevailing party attorney's fees were at issue in Glenn Wright
Homes (Delray) LLC v. Lowy, 60 2 the underlying issue presented to the Fourth
District Court of Appeal arose from the institution of a suit seeking to en-
force a promissory note prior to payment of the required documentary stamp
tax.603 Lender loaned $300,000 to Borrower and took back an unsecured
promissory note for that amount.6 Thus, there was no recorded instrument
securing the note. 6°5 Borrower defaulted and Lender sued Borrower.6°6 At
the time suit was filed-and at the time Lender filed a motion for summary
judgment-Florida documentary tax stamps had not been paid on the note as
required by sections 201.01 and 201.08 of the Florida Statutes.60 7 Lender
paid the stamp tax after the issue was raised by the court at the hearing on the
motion for summary judgment, and the court entered judgment for Lender.68
Although the trial court did not then award attorney's fees to Lender, it re-
served jurisdiction to do so.6' Borrower did not appeal that judgment, but
598. Id.; See also Tropical Jewelers, Inc. v. Nationsbank, N.A. (Tropical 1), 781 So. 2d
392, 394 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (en banc), affid sub nom. Tropical II, 19 So. 3d 424
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
599. Tropical I1, 19 So. 3d at 426.
600. 19 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
601. Id. at 427. The trial court also denied Borrower's and Guarantors' claims for damag-
es equivalent to the "surplus" they alleged would have been received if the assets had not been
disposed of in a commercially unreasonable fashion, as they "failed to prove any resulting
damages." Id. at 426. The Third District Court of Appeal did not specifically discuss this
issue in Tropical II, but rather it "affirm[ed] on all other points." Id. at 427.
602. 18 So. 3d 693 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
603. Id. at 694-95.
604. Id. at 694.
605. Id.
606. Id.
607. Lowy, 18 So. 3d at 694-95.
608. Id. at 695.
609. Id.
59
Landau: 2009-2010 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners
Published by NSUWorks, 2010
NOVA LAW REVIEW
after the trial court granted Lender's subsequently-filed motion seeking at-
torney's fees, Borrower appealed the fee award.61° On appeal, Borrower
argued that because documentary stamps had not been placed on the promis-
sory note until after the hearing on Lender's motion for summary judgment,
the note was unenforceable. 61 ' Thus, the question was how attorney fees
could be awarded for trying to enforce an unenforceable promissory note.6"2
The district court answered this question by noting the difference between
subsections (a) and (b) in section 201.08(1) of the Florida Statutes.6"3 Sub-
section (a) covers unsecured promissory notes while subsection (b) deals
with "notes or instruments secured by an instrument filed in the public
records. 6 4 Only subsection (b), which was not applicable in the present
case, prevents the enforcement of a promissory note with respect to future
advances as to which the documentary stamp tax has not been paid.6 5 The
Fourth District, in affirming the trial court, receded from its opinions in Rap-
paport v. Hollywood Beach Resort Condominium Ass'n 616 and Bonfiglio v.
Banker's Trust Co. of California617 to the extent they each held that an unse-
cured note was not enforceable in a Florida court prior to payment of the
documentary stamp tax.6 8 The district court also certified conflict with Sil-
ber v. Cn'R Industries of Jacksonville, Inc.,619 Somma v. Metra Electronics
Corp.,620 and Klein v. Royale Group, Ltd.621 as they, like Rappaport and Bon-
figlio, "appear[ed] to misread the statute. 622 The Fourth District noted:
[Florida] has a substantial interest in ensuring collection of taxes
owed. That is why it requires evidence of the payment of the tax
prior to recordation of any taxable instrument. The state has
610. Id.
611. Id.
612. Lowy, 18 So. 3d at 694.
613. Id. at 695-96.
614. Id. at 696.
615. Id. Section 201.08(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes also provides that "any person who
fails or refuses to pay such tax due by him or her is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first de-
gree." Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 201.08(1)(b) (2009)).
616. 905 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005), overruled in part by Glenn Wright
Homes (Delray) L.L.C. v. Lowy, 18 So. 3d 693 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
617. 944 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
618. See Lowy, 18 So. 3d at 696-97.
619. 526 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
620. 727 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
621. 578 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
622. Lowy, 18 So. 3d at 696.
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elected to enforce its taxes on unsecured promissory notes, howev-
er, through the use of its criminal laws and substantial penalties.
623
The court went on to point out that the Legislature might elect to bring
subsection (a) in line with subsection (b) of section 201.08(1).624
623. Id.; accord FLA. STAT. § 201.17 (2010).
624. Lowy, 18 So. 3d at 696-97.
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